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INTRODUCTION
A FTER a century of reform and experimentation, sentencing
remains a highly contested area of the criminal justice system.
Scholars and the public at large continue to disagree about the
proper purposes and functions of punishment. Opinion polls have
repeatedly indicated a high level of public dissatisfaction with the
sentences imposed by judges.' Recent sentencing innovations, such
as mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines, have attracted
wide criticism2 for their severity,3 for dehumanizing the sentencing
process,4 for aggregating dissimilar cases,5 and for shifting sentenc-
' Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics 2000, at 138-39 tbl.2.54 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001)
(showing that between 1990 and 2000, sixty-eight percent or more of citizens polled
thought that courts in their area were too lenient in their sentencing and only eight to
sixteen percent of those polled thought that courts in their area were "about right" in
their sentencing).
2 Some states have already abandoned mandatory sentencing regimes for certain
crimes, and others are contemplating similar changes in their sentencing regimes.
Susan Helen Moran, Rethinking Mandatory Minimum Sentences, UPI, Dec. 12,2001,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
'See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters 99 (1996); Frank 0. Bowman, III & Mi-
chael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug
Sentences, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1043, 1131 (2001).
'See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 3 Fed. Sentenc-
ing Rep. 339, 341 (1991) (criticizing the Guidelines for exacting "a high price in terms
of the integrity of the criminal justice process, in terms of human life and the moral
capital of the system" while yielding "arbitrary results"); Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial
Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev.
357, 366 (1992) (criticizing the Guidelines for promoting a "bureaucratic mentality"
that denies each defendant's identity as a "unique human being"). For a long list of
judicial critiques of the Guidelines, see Kate Stith & Josd A. Cabranes, Fear of Judg-
ing: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 5 (1998) ("Many federal judges have
been openly and strongly critical of the Guidelines.").
'Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Ag-
gregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 949-51 (1991); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the
Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 833, 851 (1992).
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ing discretion to prosecutors.6 Most recent critiques of the sentenc-
ing process have focused on the amount of discretion tolerated by
the system. This Article will go a step further and argue that the
source of sentencing discretion is also very important to the legiti-
macy and integrity of the sentencing process. In the absence of
wide consensus on sentencing goals, it is best to leave the sentenc-
ing decision with a deliberative democratic institution-the jury.
After decades of inattention, the question of the role of the jury
in the sentencing process has reentered the legal debate. In Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey' Harris v. United States,8 and Ring v. Arizona,9
the United States Supreme Court reexamined the proper alloca-
tion of power between judge and jury in sentencing decisions. In
Apprendi, the Court held that the government must prove to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that increase the statutory
maximum sentence for an offense. ' ° In Harris, by a five-to-four
margin, the Court refused to extend this principle to facts that in-
creased mandatory minimum sentences (though five Justices
agreed that the situations in Apprendi and Harris could not be eas-
ily distinguished)." In the same week that it handed down Harris,
the Court held in Ring that the Apprendi rationale does apply to
capital sentencing and that judges alone may not decide facts that
could raise a sentence from life imprisonment to death.
Having enhanced the jury's authority to find facts related to sen-
tencing, the Court may have opened the door to even greater juror
participation in the sentencing process. Several distinctions at-
tempted by the Court in these opinions may prove difficult to jus-
tify over time. Why, for example, should facts increasing the statu-
tory maximum sentence be treated differently from facts affecting
6 Bowman & Heise, supra note 3, at 1046-49; Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 842-45;
Joseph V. Collina, Is It Time for Jury Sentencing?, Lake County Pub. Defender, at
http:llwww.co.lake.il.us/pubdef/articles/jurysent.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003) (on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
7530 U.S. 466 (2000).
122 S. Ct. 2406 (2002).
9122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
"'Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Prior convictions are an exception to this rule and need
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. Id. at 488.
" Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); id.
at 2423-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2432.
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statutory minimums3 or the range under the Sentencing Guide-
lines?'4 Why should juries be given the final word in a decision to
impose the death sentence, while the choice between, say, a sen-
tence of five years and life imprisonment remains with a judge?
And why should juries be allowed to determine facts directly bear-
ing on sentencing, but be kept in the dark about the actual conse-
quences of their findings?'5
This Article will argue that legislatures should clear this juris-
prudential thicket and take the final logical step suggested by the
Apprendi line of decisions: reintroduction of jury sentencing. To a
greater degree than has been recognized, both historical precedent
and insights from modern democratic theory suggest that criminal
sentencing is a task to which the jury is well-suited. Moreover, our
experience with the alternatives-state and federal sentencing
guidelines, on the one hand, and discretionary sentencing by
judges, on the other-demonstrates that the supposed drawbacks
of jury sentencing are not as decisive as once thought.
Advocates of jury sentencing have been a distinct minority for
decades. Only six states currently employ jury sentencing in non-
capital cases, down from thirteen in 1960.6 For decades, legal
" This was the issue addressed in Harris. While the Court did not extend the holding
of Apprendi to statutory minimums, five Justices appeared to agree that the two situa-
tions were not distinguishable. Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2420 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and in the judgment); id. at 2423-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" The federal Sentencing Guidelines are not easily distinguishable, from a practical
standpoint, from the statutory sentencing "laws" to which Apprendi specifically ap-
plies. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the Sentencing Guidelines as "significant, legally binding prescrip-
tions" that "have the force and effect of laws").
" Recent news headlines reveal the unintended consequences to which this rule may
lead. See Dana Canedy, As Florida Boy Serves Life Term, Even Prosecutors Wonder
Why, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 2003, at Al. The Florida case involved a jury who found that
a thirteen-year-old boy who was "practicing wrestling moves" on another child-who
subsequently died-had intended to harm the child. This resulted in a verdict of first-
degree murder. Id. Unbeknownst to the jury, this meant an automatic sentence of life
without parole. Jury members were described as "horrified" to learn the effect of
their verdict, and even prosecutors expressed regret and frustration with the un-
planned outcome. Id.
16 These states are: Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia. See
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-101 (Michie Supp. 2001); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.055 (Mi-
chie 1999); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 557.036 (West 1999); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 926.1
(West Supp. 2003); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 2003);
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-295 (Michie 2000).
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scholarship has been overwhelmingly skeptical toward the prac-
tice.7 Many commentators have cited jurors' lack of experience
and expertise as the source of unwarranted sentencing disparities
and irrational verdicts." The mistrust of jury sentencing is part of a
larger discomfort with the jury as an institution. Civil juries have
been accused of being unable to handle the complex issues arising
in modem civil litigation,9 and criminal juries have been branded
as subversive of the rule of law." As the most recent Supreme
Court cases have suggested, however, the jury has continuing vital-
ity as a democratic institution.
This Article will make the case for jury sentencing from three
perspectives: the historical, the theoretical, and the practical. Part I
17 Many articles have been published in opposition to jury sentencing. See Charles
0. Betts, Jury Sentencing, 2 Nat'l Probation & Parole Ass'n J. 369, 369 (1956); Ran-
dall R. Jackson, Missouri's Jury Sentencing Law: A Relic the Legislature Should Lay
to Rest, 55 J. Mo. B. 14, 14 (1999); James P. Jouras, On Modernizing Missouri's
Criminal Punishment Procedure, 20 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 299, 301 (1952); Charles
Kerr, A Needed Reform in Criminal Procedure, 6 Ky. L.J. 107, 108 (1918); H.M. La-
Font, Assessment of Punishment-A Judge or Jury Function?, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 835,
837 (1960); Charles S. Potts, Suggested Changes in Our Criminal Procedure, 4 Sw.
L.J. 437, 447-49 (1950); Robert S. Stubbs II, Jury Sentencing in Georgia-Time for a
Change?, 5 Ga. St. B.J. 421, 425-30 (1969); Charles W. Webster, Jury Sentencing-
Grab-Bag Justice, 14 Sw. L.J. 221, 230 (1960); Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing
in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 45 Wash. U. J. Urb. &
Contemp. L. 3, 39 (1994); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108
Yale L.J. 1355, 1374-75 (1999) (reviewing Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear of
Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in Federal Courts (1998)); Comment, Consideration
of Punishment by Juries, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 400, 400-01 (1950); Edward A. Linden,
Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 Va. L. Rev. 968, 1001 (1967); Craig Reese, Note,
Jury Sentencing in Texas: Time for a Change?, 31 S. Tex. L. Rev. 323, 337 (1990). By
contrast, in the last sixty years, the published legal scholarship in favor of jury sen-
tencing amounts to one student note. See Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in
Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 Yale L.J. 1775,
1776 (1999). This Article will build on the social science arguments marshaled in
Lanni's note and will argue for the salience of jury sentencing from the perspectives
of history, political theory, and recent Supreme Court precedent.
" See Betts, supra note 17, at 372; Webster, supra note 17, at 226-27; Weninger, su-
pra note 17, at 20; Wright, supra note 17, at 1376.
"' See William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and
Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern
Civil Litigation, 67 Va. L. Rev. 887, 889-91 (1981); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in
Complex Civil Litigation, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 898, 898 (1979).
"See Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims of Jury Nullifica-
tion, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 285, 286 (1999); Kate Stith-Cabranes, The Criminal
Jury in Our Time, 3 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 133, 133-35 (1995).
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of this Article will survey the history of jury sentencing from colo-
nial times to the present. This history reveals that jury sentencing-
a uniquely American innovation-was a valued democratic institu-
tion in the early republic, but was gradually abandoned in the
twentieth century as scientific approaches to punishment came into
favor. The most recent developments from the Supreme Court
suggest, however, that jury sentencing may be on the rise again.
Part II will enlist the insights of modem political theory, particu-
larly the ideas of deliberative democratic theory, to show that the
movement away from jury sentencing has not been entirely healthy
for either the sentencing process or American democracy as a
whole. Part III will address the practical objections that have been
leveled against jury sentencing, and will suggest that the vast ma-
jority of these are either exaggerated or equally present in alterna-
tive sentencing regimes. The jury, therefore, emerges as an equally
competent, yet more legitimate, sentencing institution. Finally, Part
IV will outline the actual contours of a possible jury sentencing re-
gime that balances the democratic virtues of jury involvement with
efficiency, uniformity, and other values important to the sentencing
process.
I. FROM POPULAR TO PROFESSIONAL JUSTICE: JURY SENTENCING
FROM COLONIAL TO MODERN TIMES
A. Jury Sentencing in the Early Republic
Sentencing juries trace their origins to the early American re-
public. They were not a feature of the English common law. Al-
though English juries often delivered "pious perjury" verdicts, ac-
quitting defendants of certain charges to prevent unduly harsh
sentences,21 they did not have formal sentencing authority. Legisla-
tors of many early American states abandoned the common law
tradition and vested juries with sentencing power.' Enthusiasm for
self-government and memories of arbitrary Crown-appointed
214 William Blackstone, Commentaries *238-39; see also Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 245 (1999) (noting that juries devised extralegal ways of avoiding a guilty
verdict on certain counts if the punishment associated with the offense seemed dis-
proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct).
22 See Linden, supra note 17, at 970-71; Reese, supra note 17, at 326-27.
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judges motivated the change.' Reformers also thought that juries
were uniquely capable of assessing the proper punishment because,
as members of the local community, they were more likely to be
well-acquainted with the defendant's background and the particu-
lar circumstances of the offense.24 The rise of jury sentencing was
also likely related to a development in American punishment re-
gimes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As
punishment options expanded beyond shaming sanctions and the
mandatory death penalty' and came to include various ranges and
modes of imprisonment, there was more room for case-by-case de-
cisionmaking to which juries were thought to be well-suited.
In 1796, Virginia was the first state to formally adopt jury sen-
tencing for all criminal offenses.' It did so in the same reform legis-
lation in which it adopted imprisonment as the punishment for a
variety of felonies. By the second half of the nineteenth century,
ten more states allowed juries to assess punishment to varying de-
grees.' Although the fear of oppression by colonial judges was by
2 See Betts, supra note 17, at 370.24 Jouras, supra note 17, at 304 (citing jury sentencing proponents for the proposi-
tion that juries are oftentimes in a better position "to know the history of the accused
and ... therefore assess the proper punishment accordingly").
See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467,
1507 (2001).
2' Act of Dec. 22, 1796, § 15, 1796 Va. Acts ch. 2. Jury sentencing was used for cer-
tain misdemeanors in Virginia as early as 1776. Linden, supra note 17, at 971.
z Act of Dec. 22, 1796, §§ 5-14, 1796 Va. Acts ch. 2; Kathryn Preyer, Crime, the
Criminal Law, and Reform in Post-Revolutionary Virginia, 1 Law & Hist. Rev. 53, 84-
85 (1983).
Ala. Code §§ 3620-3621 (1852); Act of Oct. 26, 1831, § 1, 1831 Ark. Acts 30, 30-
31; Act of Feb. 15, 1831, § 42, 1830 IlM. Laws 103, 113; Act of June 17, 1852, § 116,
[2] 1852 Ind. Acts 361, 377; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19 (Bullitt-Feland 1887); Act of Jan.
12, 1831, ch. 25, § 1, 1830 Mo. Laws 33, 33; N.D. Cent. Code §§ 6809-6810 (1895); Act
of Dec. 9, 1829, ch. 23, § 72, 1829 Tenn. Pub. Acts 27, 44; Act of Apr. 30, 1846, § 1,
1846 Tex. Gen. Laws 161, 161; Hawkins v. State, 3 Stew. & P. 63, 64 (Ala. 1832) (not-
ing an 1807 statute providing for jury assessment of fines); Graham v. State, 1 Ark.
171, 183 (1838) (noting the power of Arkansas juries to assess and determine a defen-
dant's punishment); Blevings v. People, 2 11. (1 Scam.) 171, 172 (1835) (construing the
1833 Illinois Criminal Code to grant the jury the power to sentence); Clark v. State, 77
Ind. 399, 401 (1881) (noting the power of Indiana juries to fix a defendant's punish-
ment); Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 2 S.W. 235,242 (Ky. 1886) (extolling the virtues
of jury sentencing); State v. Mish, 92 P. 459, 462 (Mont. 1907) (Brantly, J., dissenting)
(noting that the jury may fix punishment under Mont. Pen. Code, § 2150); see also
Betts, supra note 17, at 370 (noting that the adoption of jury sentencing in Texas was
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that time a distant memory, sentencing juries were still seen as a
tribunal "ready to protect those charged with offenses from any at-
tack of arbitrary power."29 The enthusiasm for sentencing juries
may also have been related to a more general fear of unelected
judges, who were perceived as elitist and unresponsive to popular
wishes. 0 Indeed, many states adopted jury sentencing in the mid-
nineteenth century, at the same time that the movement for elec-
tive judiciary gathered speed.3 Thus, it is no surprise that when it
came to crime and punishment, juries-reflecting the wisdom and
preferences of twelve ordinary citizens-seemed a better safeguard
against unfair sentences than a single judge.
In the early twentieth century, three more states-Georgia,33
Mississippi,' and Oklahoma35-gave juries sentencing powers.
Oklahoma adopted jury sentencing upon attaining statehood. It is
a reaction to the arbitrariness of judges appointed by the Spanish and Mexican gov-
ernments).
Cornelison, 2 S.W. at 242.
o Haynes documents the rise in the nineteenth century of hostility "toward the
whole machinery of judicial administration," including judges. Evan Haynes, The Se-
lection and Tenure of Judges 96-97 (1944). The "democratic fervor" of the era
"tended... to bring nearly all public officers under direct popular control, the judges
among the rest" and led to both the enactment of statutory and constitutional provi-
sions for the election of judges and the attempted removal of several state court
judges who had struck down democratically enacted statutes as unconstitutional. Id.
at 90-95.
" Id. at 80-135. At least four states-Alabama, Mississippi, Montana, and North
Dakota, switched to judicial elections around the same time that they adopted jury
sentencing. Id. at 101-35 (listing the years in which those states switched to judicial
elections as, respectively, 1850, 1910, 1889, and 1889).
32 As Judge Sherwood of the Supreme Court of Missouri explained:
Our legislators and our constitution framers were doubtless aware of the men-
tioned danger,-of the one-man power,--and therefore carefully guarded every
avenue against its stealthy approaches and its insidious advance. Again, the as-
sessment of the punishment to be inflicted is part and parcel of the issue joined
between the state and the prisoner.
State v. Hamey, 67 S.W. 620, 636 (Mo. 1902) (Sherwood, J., dissenting).
3 Act of Aug. 18, 1919, No. 230, § 1, 1919 Ga. Laws 387, 387; see also Butt v. State,
103 S.E. 466, 467 (Ga. 1920) ("[T]he jur[ies] ... are invested by law with the right and
power of fixing the punishment by recommendation to life imprisonment, and
whether they will so recommend or not is a matter entirely in their discretion, which is
not limited or confined in any case.").
-' Miss. Code Ann. § 1359 (1906). In Mississippi, the jury's sentencing power was
limited to sexual assault offenses. See id.
" Act of May 12, 1908, § 1, 1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 462,462.
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likely that this choice was part of Oklahoma's decision to model all
of its statutes upon those of Arkansas, where jury sentencing was
already well-entrenched. In Georgia, jury sentencing was adopted
partly as a means of promoting uniformity of punishment for simi-
lar offenses, a task at which (contrary to modern-day conventional
wisdom) judges were perceived to be inadequate.37
Thus, by 1919, fourteen states gave juries sentencing powers in
non-capital cases.' In several other jurisdictions, juries had the au-
thority-whether it was statutory or judicially created-to recom-
mend a merciful sentence. Even in jurisdictions where no direct
jury sentencing existed, determinate sentencing regimes allowed
jurors to influence sentencing circuitously, just as their English
predecessors had done, by acquitting defendants of some charges,
despite clear evidence of guilt.'
The heyday of sentencing juries was also the time when the
criminal jury had significant powers to decide matters of law."
From the beginning, the jury's power to determine legal issues was
greater in the colonies than in England42 and was stronger in crimi-
See Glover v. United States, 91 S.W. 41, 42 (Indian Terr. 1905).
See Stubbs, supra note 17, at 423 n.13.
Ala. Code §§ 3620-3621 (1852); Act of Oct. 26, 1831, § 1, 1831 Ark. Acts 30, 30-
31; Act of Aug. 18, 1919, No. 230, § 1, 1919 Ga. Laws 387, 387; Act of Feb. 15, 1831,
§ 42, 1830 Il. Laws 103, 113; Ind. Code Ann. §§ 2150-2153 (Michie 1908); Act of Mar.
23, 1916, ch. 39, § 1, 1916 Ky. Acts 430, 430-31; Miss. Code Ann. § 1359 (1906) (limit-
ing jury sentencing to sexual assault cases); Act of Jan. 12, 1831, ch. 25, § 1, 1830 Mo.
Laws 33, 33; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 12027 (Smith 1921); N.D. Cent. Code 88 6809-
6810 (1895); Act of May 12, 1908, § 1, 1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 462, 462; Act of
Dec. 9, 1829, ch. 23, § 72, 1829 Tenn. Pub. Acts 27, 44; Act of Apr. 30, 1846, § 1, 1846
Tex. Gen. Laws 161,161; Va. Code Ann. § 3903 (Michie 1887).
"E.g., State v. Thomas, 111 A. 538 (Del. Oyer. Ter. 1920); State v. Lapista, 105 A.
676 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1918); Green v. State, 113 So. 1221 (Fla. 1927); State v. Caraba-
jal, 193 P. 406 (N.M. 1920); State v. Jukanovich, 146 P. 289 (Utah 1915); Comment,
Consideration of Punishment by Juries, supra note 17, at 401 nn.7-8.
"'The practice of "pious perjury" was especially prevalent in capital cases. See
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976); Philip English Mackey, The In-
utility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U. L. Rev. 32, 32-
34(1974).
"See Wright, supra note 17, at 1374 (noting that sentencing juries were "well-
entrenched" by the middle of the nineteenth century); see infra notes 70-71 and ac-
companying text.
42 As mentioned earlier, although English juries did not have the right to decide
matters of law, they effectively nullified laws when they acquitted defendants in the
face of evidence sufficient for conviction. See Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict Ac-
cording to Conscience: Perspectives on the English Criminal Trial Jury 1200-1800, at
2003] 319
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nal than in civil cases.43 American colonists claimed the jury's
power to decide legal issues as a right because, like the proponents
of jury sentencing, they believed it was an essential tool for pro-
moting self-government and curbing official arbitrariness." The au-
thority of the criminal jury to determine law as well as facts was
taken as self-evident in many colonies4" and was confirmed in con-
stitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions throughout the United
States.46
Accordingly, courts in criminal cases frequently informed jurors
of their right to disregard the judge's instructions on the law, while
simultaneously reminding them of their duty to follow the law as
written and explained by the judge.47 Juries were seen as partners
"in a joint enterprise with the judge, with respect to determinations
62-63 (1985). American colonists went beyond the common law tradition in recogniz-
ing the jury's power to nullify laws as a right: "The ability to determine law was some-
thing more than the power to bring in a general verdict .... American judges actually
asserted an almost plenary power in the jury to decide the law as it saw fit." Matthew
P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 Wis. L. Rev.
377, 378, 387.
,See Harrington, supra note 42.
See id. at 395-96.
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in
the United States, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 867, 903-06 (1994); see also Sparf v. United
States, 156 U.S. 51, 142-51 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (reviewing American colonial
cases that affirmed the authority of criminal juries to determine issues of law as well
as fact).
"See, e.g., Ga. Const. of 1777, art. XLI ("The jury shall be judges of law, as well as
of fact, and shall not be allowed to bring in a special verdict ... ."); Ind. Const. of
1851, art. I, § 64 ("In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to de-
termine the law and the facts."); Md. Const. art. 23 ("In the trial of all criminal cases
the Jury shall be the Judges of Law as well as of fact...."); Pa. Const. of 1790, art.
IX, § 7 ("[I]n all indictments for libels, the jury shall have a right to determine the law
and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases."); Act of Mar. 12,
1808, ch. 139, § 15, 1808 Mass. Acts 382, 389 (declaring the right of juries to "decide at
their discretion, by a general verdict, both the fact and the law, involved in the issue");
Commonwealth v. Knapp, 27 Mass. (9 Pick.) 477, 496 (1830) ("As the jury have the
right ... to return a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, they must necessarily, in the
discharge of this duty, decide such questions of law as well as of fact, as are involved
in this general question; and there is no mode in which their opinions upon questions
of law can be reviewed by this Court or by any other tribunal."); see also Jeffrey
Abramson, We, the Jury 75 (2000) ("[T]he criminal jury's prerogative to decide ques-
tions of law lasted well into the nineteenth century."); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as
Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 582, 591-96 (1939) (noting that judicial de-
cisions in the colonies recognized the jury's power to determine legal issues).
" See Howe, supra note 46, at 592-96.
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of law and fact; judge-jury cooperation was the rule in both ar-
eas."' Partnership between juries and judges was also common in
sentencing matters. In the states with jury sentencing, judges in-
structed jurors on the range of punishment authorized by the legis-
lature and were often authorized to intervene in the sentencing
process by reducing the sentence imposed by the jury,49 imposing
hard labor or solitary confinement' in addition to the jury's as-
sessment of fines, or determining the place of confinement im-
posed by the jury. 1
The jury's power to sentence was related to its power to decide
the law in another important way. In the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, jurors frequently used their power to determine legal
matters as a way of challenging or nullifying unjust legislation. 2 As
widely documented by legal historians, colonial jurors often re-
fused to enforce navigation acts and acquitted persons accused of
seditious libel in protest against the unfairness of these laws. 3 Simi-
larly, prior to the Civil War, juries in the North acquitted defen-
dants indicted for violating the Fugitive Slave Law.' Jurors also
, Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 Yale L.J. 170,
173 (1964).49 See, e.g., State v. Bevins, 43 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Mo. 1931) (noting the power of the
judge to reduce the sentence imposed by the jury).
5 E.g., Act of Feb. 15, 1831, § 42, 1830 Ill. Laws 103, 113 (providing that the jury
"shall fix the term and nature of the confinement, as is provided by this act; [but] the
judge, in passing a sentence on the prisoner, shall say in said sentence, how long the
prisoner shall be confined, how long to solitary confinement, and how long to hard
labor, and to either or both").
" See, e.g., Washington v. State, 23 So. 697, 697 (Ala. 1898) (holding that, although
juries fix the period of punishment, judges decide the kind or character of punishment
to be imposed).
2 The jury's discretion to decide matters of law was effectively much greater when
the jury opted for acquittal rather than conviction, since the Double Jeopardy Clause
ensured that the verdict was not subject to review. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rihts as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1190 (1991).
Abramson, supra note 46, at 74-75; James Alexander, A Brief Narrative of the
Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger, Printer of The New York Weekly Journal 41-
105 (2d ed. 1972); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 45, at 874 ("Zenger's trial was not an
aberration; during the pre-Revolutionary period, juries and grand juries all but nulli-
fied the law of seditious libel in the colonies."); Harrington, supra note 42, at 393-94
(discussing juries' refusal to enforce navigation and sedition laws).
' Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 175-225
(1975). Unfortunately, the power to nullify was not always used to benign ends:
Scholars have noted the history of acquittals against the evidence in lynching cases in
the post-Reconstruction South. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 45, at 890-91.
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acquitted defendants in capital cases when the death penalty
seemed a disproportionate punishment for the underlying crime:"
This widespread nullification may have prompted several more
states to grant juries the authority to decide the punishment in
capital cases.56 Allowing the jury leeway in sentencing, the reason-
ing went, was more acceptable than the numerous acquittals result-
ing from the jury's reluctance to impose the death penalty in par-
ticular cases.
As the nullification cases demonstrate, the jury-whether at trial
or at sentencing-operated as a deeply political institution in the
early republic.57 It played a central part in the American system of
checks and balances. 8 Many compared juries to legislatures be-
cause juries provided an opportunity for direct popular participa-
tion in government. 9 The Anti-Federalists were especially con-
cerned that as the central government acquired new powers, it
would grow distant from the concerns of ordinary citizens.'
" See Mackey, supra note 40, at 32-34.
6 See Ex parte Giles, 632 So. 2d 577, 581 (Ala. 1993); Commonwealth v. Mutina,
323 N.E.2d 294, 300 n.7 (Mass. 1975).
" More recent Supreme Court opinions reflect this historical understanding. See
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 & n.7 (1975) (noting that the jury "plays a po-
litical function in the administration of the law" and that "the jury is designed not
only to understand the case, but also to reflect the community's sense of justice in de-
ciding it"); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481, 485 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that juries "play[ I an essential
role in legitimating the system of criminal justice" and are "a significant and reliable
objective index of contemporary values") (citations omitted); cf. 1 Alexis de Toc-
queville, Democracy in America 282 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., Fran-
cis Bowen rev., 1946) (1835) ("The jury is above all, a political institution, and it must
be regarded in this light in order to be duly appreciated.").
-" Letter from The Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1782), reprinted in 2 Complete Anti-
Federalist 245, 249-50 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("It is essential in every free
country, that common people should have a part and share of influence, in the judicial
as well as in the legislative department .... The trial by jury in the judicial depart-
ment and the collection of the people by their representatives in the legislature are
those fortunate inventions which have procured for them, in this country, their true
proportion of influence...."); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and
Criminal Procedure: First Principles 165 (1997) ("The jury was to check the judge-
much as the legislature was to check the executive, the House to check the Senate,
and the states to check the national government.").
59 Amar, supra note 58, at 167; see also Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Politi-
cal Participation Akin to Voting, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 203, 218-21 (1995) (detailing
early support for the jury as a vehicle for civic participation).
'0 See Amar, supra note 58, at 161-64.
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Against this background, juries became the embodiment of the
ideal of a decentralized democracy. They were seen as the vehicle
through which community concerns could be made to bear on im-
portant political decisions. As the Federal Farmer argued:
The jury trial, especially politically considered, is by far the most
important feature in the judicial department in a free coun-
try .... The body of the people, principally, bear the burdens of
the community; they of right ought to have a controul in its im-
portant concerns, both in making and executing the laws, other-
wise they may, in a short time, be ruined.6
Some early commentators on American democracy also empha-
sized the function of the jury as a school of civic virtue-a forum in
which citizens learned how to take charge of political affairs in
their community. Tocqueville, for example, argued that the jury
"may be regarded as a gratuitous public school, ever open, in which
every juror learns his rights.., and becomes practically acquainted
with the laws."'62 Federal judges in the early republic appreciated
the educative potential of jury service and used jury charges to in-
struct jurors not only on the case before them, but on the criminal
law generally or even on political matters of the day.63
The educative function of jury service made the jury valuable
not only as a means of dispute resolution, but also as an essential
component of American democracy. This strong belief in the de-
mocratic and educational functions of jury service resulted in juries
enjoying broad authority in the early republic. More than factfind-
ers, juries decided the fate of the defendants they convicted.
1 Letter from The Federal Farmer (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 Complete Anti-
Federalist, supra note 58, at 315, 320.
'? 1 Tocqueville, supra note 57, at 285; see also Letter from The Federal Farmer, su-
pra note 61, at 320 (pointing to the jury as one of the "means by which the people are
let into the knowledge of public affairs"); Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-
Government 239 (1859) (praising the jury as "the greatest practical school of free citi-
zenship").
"3 Neal Katyal, Judges As Advicegivers, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1709, 1728-31 (1998).
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B. The Decline of the Jury's Authority and Changing Theories of
Penology
As the nineteenth century progressed, courts began restricting
the authority first of the civil jury, and then of the criminal jury. On
the civil side, demands for consistency and predictability in increas-
ingly complex litigation prompted calls for judicial decisionmaking
bound by precedent and expounded in written opinions.' In addi-
tion, the codification and federalization of many areas of civil law
meant that local input in adjudication was no longer essential.' The
gulf between the roles of juries and judges grew as the rise of law
schools created a new class of specially trained legal experts.' Al-
though criminal law remained more accessible to laypersons, a
general emphasis on consistency and rule of law disfavored jury
participation in adjudication of criminal matters as well.67
By the 1820s, using devices such as new trials and special ver-
dicts, state judges had all but taken away civil juries' power to de-
termine matters of law,"s even as statutes and constitutions in many
states continued to grant jurors the power to judge both fact and
law.69 The jury's power to decide matters of law in criminal cases,
however, survived until the end of the nineteenth century.0 In a
"
4Darryl K. Brown, Structure and Relationship in the Jurisprudence of Juries:
Comparing the Capital Sentencing and Punitive Damages Doctrines, 47 Hastings L.J.
1255, 1273 (1996). The professionalization of the bar was an important power driving
these changes. See Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar 3-28 (1980).
0 Cf. Abramson, supra note 46, at 90 ("The fight over the jury's right to decide
questions of law was another front in the battle over the geography of democracy in
America.").
6 Warren, supra note 64, at 3-28.
67 As the Supreme Court remarked in Sparfv. United States, juries would be "uncon-
trolled by any settled, fixed, legal principles" and therefore incapable of providing
"the protection equally of society and of individuals in their essential rights" if given
unrestrained authority to decide questions of law. 156 U.S. 51, 102-03 (1895).
6 Brown, supra note 64, at 1269-70; Harrington, supra note 42, at 379, 414-23.
6 Howe, supra note 46, at 596-613, 614 nn.125-26.
70 The power remained strong in certain states in the mid-nineteenth century (nota-
bly, most of these states also practiced jury sentencing). See Ind. Const. of 1851, art. I,
§ 19; Md. Const. art. 23; State v. Jones, 5 Ala. 666, 668-69 (1843); McDaniel v. State,
30 Ga. 853 (1860) (noting that when the jury cannot conscientiously adopt the law as
it is given to them in the charge by the court, "it is not only their right, but their duty,
to find a verdict according to the opinion which they entertain of the law"); Fisher v.
People, 23 Ill. 218, 230-31 (1860); Doss v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 557, 559
(1844) ("The jury in a criminal cause are the judges of the law and the evidence."). By
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landmark 1895 criminal case, the Supreme Court held that, in fed-
eral court, questions of law were outside the jury's province:
Upon the court rests the responsibility of declaring the law; upon
the jury, the responsibility of applying the law so declared to the
facts as they, upon their conscience, believe them to be. Under
any other system, the courts, although established in order to de-
clare the law, would for every practical purpose be eliminated
from our system of government as instrumentalities devised for
the protection equally of society and of individuals in their essen-
tial rights. When that occurs our government will cease to be a
government of laws, and become a government of men.71
By the early twentieth century, therefore, courts had begun to
seriously reconsider the powers of the criminal jury. By 1930, the
Supreme Court allowed defendants to waive their rights to trial by
a twelve-member jury, thereby implying that the right to a jury trial
was principally for the benefit of the defendant, not the community
at large.' Lawrence Friedman points out that "[b]y 1938, twenty-
one states and the federal government allowed bench trials."'73 By
the late 1920s, plea bargaining had increased dramatically (reach-
ing ninety percent of felony convictions in New York state), leav-
ing an ever smaller percentage of criminal cases to judgment by
jury74
Jury sentencing survived this first wave of restrictions on jury
powers.75 Even jury sentencing, however, was slowly being eroded
by the professionalization of the law of punishment. By 1910, re-
the end of the nineteenth century, however, even jury sentencing states curtailed thejury's power to decide legal issues. E.g., Brown v. State, 40 Ga. 689 (1870) (denying
the jury's right to ignore instructions); Murray v. Heinze, 42 P. 1057, 1061 (Mont.
1895); Ford v. State, 47 S.W. 703, 704 (Tenn. 1898); Harris v. State, 75 Tenn. 538, 543-
44 (1881); Pridgen v. State, 31 Tex. 421 (1868); Brown v. Commonwealth, 10 S.E. 745
(Va. 1890).
Sparf, 156 U.S. at 102-03.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297-98 (1930). Some states soon followed
suit. E.g., Palmer v. State, 25 S.E.2d 295 (Ga. 1943); Boaze v. Commonwealth, 183
S.E. 263,264 (Va. 1936).
' Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 389 (1993).
All states allowed bench trials by 1960. Id.
7Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 45, at 924-25.
"Indeed, three states, Georgia, Mississippi, and Oklahoma, switched to jury sen-
tencing in the early twentieth century. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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flecting progressive beliefs in the possibility of the rehabilitation of
criminal offenders 6 many state legislatures-and then Congress-
passed laws that created parole and probation systems." Probation
officers gathered and analyzed information about the defendant's
character and prepared a pre-sentencing report that served as the
basis for the ultimate sentence.78 Parole commissioners, trained in
penology and insulated from political pressures,79 determined when
prisoners had been rehabilitated and could be reintegrated into so-
ciety. Although parole officers had wide latitude in setting the re-
lease date for prisoners, offenders in federal court could not be pa-
roled before they had served one-third of the sentence imposed by
the court.' Judges, in turn, were expected to rely on pre-sentence
reports and on their own legal expertise in fashioning individual-
ized sentences consistent with the rehabilitative model.
The emphasis on expertise and rehabilitation, rather than on ret-
ribution and community wisdom, further diminished the authority
of the jury. Some defendants challenged the new system on the
ground that it infringed on their right to trial by jury."' These chal-
lenges inevitably failed, in part because the right to punishment by
jury was statutory and not constitutional.' The end result of this
transformation was that a class of professional parole officers,
commissioners, and criminal justice experts had sprung into exis-
tence and assumed a large role in determining defendants' actual
punishment.
By the 1950s, therefore, the belief in the jury as a political and
legal decisionmaking institution was considerably eroded, and an
76See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 4, at 16-17. For a discussion of the rise of the
rehabilitative model of sentencing in the early twentieth century, see, for example,
Edward Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and Parole System,
16 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 9, 18-21 (1925).
' See An Act to Parole United States Prisoners, ch. 387, §§ 2-10, 36 Stat. 819 (1910)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202-4208 (2000)) (repealed 1984); Stith &
Cabranes, supra note 4, at 18; Lindsey, supra note 76, at 52-58 (documenting the
adoption of parole laws by various states in the period from 1900 to 1910).
78 Stanton Wheeler et al., Sitting in Judgment: The Sentencing of White-Collar
Criminals 42-43 (1988).
79 Parole officials were appointed for fixed terms, and their decisions were largely
shielded from public scrutiny. Stith & Cabranes, supra note 4, at 21.
18 U.S.C. § 4205 (repealed 1984).
SI Lindsey, supra note 76, at 51.
2 Id. at 51-52.
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ethos of professionalization had emerged around the practice of
sentencing. The intellectual stage was set for an assault on the
practice of jury sentencing.
C. From Science to Math: The Final Collapse of Jury Sentencing
The decline of the jury's political role and the ascent of the sci-
entific approach to punishment in the first half of the twentieth
century shook the intellectual foundations of jury sentencing, mak-
ing it appear an anachronism in the states where it existed. In the
1950s and 1960s, much legal scholarship argued for complete aboli-
tion of the practice.' By the 1970s and 1980s, another intellectual
current threatened to diminish its prevalence-the rise of determi-
nate sentencing, accompanied by mathematical models and grids.
The rise of determinate sentencing was, in many ways, a repudia-
tion of the rehabilitative model that had come into vogue in the
first half of the century. By the 1970s, the methodology and phi-
losophical premises of the rehabilitative model became the subjects
of severe criticism. Scholars and public officials complained that at-
tempts at individualized treatment of offenders produced unwar-
ranted disparities among cases.' In addition, the growth in violent
crime in the late 1960s and 1970s discredited the adequacy and at-
tainability of rehabilitation as a sentencing objective.' Finally,
some of the most fervent advocates for change in the indetermi-
N3 See Betts, supra note 17, at 371-73; Jouras, supra note 17, at 305-06; Kerr, supra
note 17, at 108; LaFont, supra note 17, at 837; Potts, supra note 17, at 447-49; Web-
ster, supra note 17, at 228-29; Comment, Consideration of Punishment by Juries, su-
pra note 17, at 405-08.
' See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 133 (1969);
President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Admin. of Justice, The Challenge of
Crime in a Free Society 357-58 (1969).
5 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 4, at 31 ("The vehemence of this criticism grew as
crime rates increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s and, with them, the number of
media accounts of parolees... who committed new, violent crimes."); see Lanni, su-
pra note 17, at 1778 (noting the waning of the rehabilitative model as a result of rising
crime); see also Ernest Van den Haag, Punishing Criminals: Concerning a Very Old
and Painful Question 10 (1975) (arguing that retribution is the proper basis for pun-
ishment); Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 45 (1976)
(advocating a "just deserts" approach to sentencing); James Q. Wilson, Thinking
About Crime 199-201 (rev. ed. 1975) (advocating incapacitation); Gary S. Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968) (claim-
ing that deterrence is the proper basis for sentencing).
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nate sentencing regime argued that judges contributed to sentenc-
ing disparities by basing their sentencing decisions on ideological
or emotional dispositions.'
Responding to these concerns with indeterminate sentencing,
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 aimed both to eliminate un-
warranted sentencing disparities in federal courts and to amend the
philosophy of sentencing to include "just deserts" and "crime con-
trol" considerations.' As part of the reform legislation, Congress
abolished parole in the federal system and created the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission ("the Commission"). The Act charged the
Commission with the task of drafting mandatory guidelines to ad-
dress the problem of unwarranted sentencing disparities.'
Consensus on a comprehensive sentencing philosophy, however,
was hard to muster. In the absence of a clear congressional man-
date,' the Commission felt that it could not make the choice
among sentencing goals that were fiercely contested:
Such a choice would be profoundly difficult. The relevant litera-
ture is vast, the arguments deep, and each point of view has much
to be said in its favor. A clear-cut Commission decision in favor
of one of these approaches would diminish the chance that the
guidelines would find the widespread acceptance they need for
effective implementation. 9°
Instead of dealing with the thorny question of sentencing pur-
poses, the Commission focused on the mechanics of sentence de-
' Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 23 (1973) ("The par-
ticular defendant on some existential day confronts a specific judge. The occupant of
the bench on that day may be punitive, patriotic, self-righteous, guilt-ridden, and
more than customarily dyspeptic.").
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 28 U.S.C.).
8 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1.1 (1990).
'9 Unable to agree on a sentencing purpose, Congress simply listed all possible sen-
tencing objectives to be considered by the Sentencing Commission in drawing up the
Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2000) (listing retribu-
tion, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation as goals for the sentencing court to
consider and for the Sentencing Commission to include in its Guidelines); see also
Stith & Cabranes, supra note 4, at 52 (noting the tension between these goals and "the
vast uncertainty and disagreement over what particular types of penalties are most
efficacious in achieving any of these purposes").
9 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (1990).
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termination. The Sentencing Guidelines ("the Guidelines") estab-
lished a mathematical system of calculating the proper punishment,
taking into account factors such as the offense level and prior
criminal conduct of the offender. In effect, the Guidelines replaced
individualized moral judgment with "complex quantitative calcula-
tions that convey[ed] the impression of scientific precision and ob-
jectivity."91
At the state level, sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentenc-
ing laws also became more popular in the 1980s.' Eight states
adopted presumptive or voluntary guidelines in the 1980s, and
eight more joined them over the next decade.' Like their federal
counterparts, most state sentencing reformers also abolished pa-
role.94 Moreover, while many states relied on rather flexible (and,
in some cases, voluntary) sentencing guidelines to cabin judicial
discretion,95 some legislatures passed determinate sentencing stat-
utes that, like the federal laws, defined a presumptive sentence for
each statutory offense and allowed only a narrow range of devia-
tions from the statutory sentence.96
The onset of determinate sentencing kept the professionalization
originally introduced by the rehabilitative model, while jettisoning
much of what remained of individual judicial discretion. The sen-
tencing trajectory had thus progressed as follows: From citizens'
judgment in the early republic, to discretion by judges guided by
criminal justice professionals in the early twentieth century, to
mathematical formulas in the late twentieth century. At the latest
stage of this development, rigid presumptive guidelines-especially
when coupled with mandatory sentencing laws-left little room for
discretion even by judges. Instead, sentences came to be deter-
"' Stith & Cabranes, supra note 4, at 82.
' Indeed, state sentencing guidelines predated those at the federal level. Minnesota
charged a sentencing commission with promulgating guidelines in 1978. Act of Apr. 5,
1978, ch. 723, § 9, 1978 Minn. Laws 761,765-67.
"' American Sentencing Guidelines Systems as of June 1999, at http://Wvvw.ussc.govl
states/asgs.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Asso-
ciation) [hereinafter Sentencing Guidelines Systems]. As of 1999, seven more states
were studying proposals for sentencing guidelines. Id.
'Id.
A See Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 679, 681-84 (1992).
Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness
of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 61, 63 (1993).
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mined mechanically on the basis of grids prepared in advance by
the sentencing commissions.
In such an environment, jury sentencing appeared more archaic
than ever before. By the early 1980s, six states had completely
abandoned sentencing by juries: Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Montana, and North Dakota. ' Mississippi used jury sentenc-
ing only in rape and statutory rape cases.98 Even the eight states
that retained the practice for a wider range of offenses reformed
their systems to take account of new sentencing goals." Two more
states, Tennessee and Oklahoma, abolished the practice in the
1990s,"° leaving the number of jury sentencing states at five by
1998.101
D. The Flaws of Determinate Sentencing
The avowedly objective, mathematical approach to punishment
did not, however, shield determinate sentencing from criticism.
With respect to the federal system, commentators complained
about the lack of transparency in the process by which the Com-
mission gathered and interpreted data."° Under the veneer of
mathematical certainty, many saw political agendas influencing the
shape of the sentencing guidelines. 3 Many critiques focused on the
Commission's departure from past judicial sentencing practices in
97 See Jackson, supra note 17, at 15; Lanni, supra note 17, at 1791 nn.70-71.
' Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-65, 97-3-71 (1972).
99 Jackson, supra note 17, at 15; Lanni, supra note 17, at 1791 nn.70-71.
... Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-203 (1997); Oklahoma Truth in Sentencing Act, ch. 133,
1997 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 501 (West).
1. See supra note 16. Oklahoma reinstated jury sentencing in 1999. Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 22, § 926.1 (West 2002).
1 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 4, at 65-66 (noting that commentators accused the
Commission of deliberately obfuscating the rationales for particular design decisions).
1
'Id. The composition of the Commission gave added force to charges that the
Commission's decisions were politically motivated. Unlike the experts of the previous
regime-the parole officials-the Commission was a much more visibly political body
and could not claim neutrality, detachment, or even expertise as its basis for legiti-
macy. See id. at 49. Moreover, despite its political character, the Commission was
"two increments removed" from political accountability and had few of the con-
straints that other agencies had. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and
the Administrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 Cal.
L. Rev. 1, 7-23 (1991).
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selected areas, such as robbery and fraud. In these areas, the
Commission established sentencing guidelines that were signifi-
cantly more severe than both past judicial practice and the manda-
tory minimums imposed by Congress, yet it presented no overarch-
ing principle or political mandate that justified these selective
departures. 5
The Commission's work was assailed not only for its lack of
transparency, but also for failing to achieve its goal of fair sentenc-
ing.0' In an effort to reduce judicial discretion in sentencing, the
Commission created rigid categories that grouped together cases
that were dissimilar in important respects." The extreme rigidity of
this sentencing regime effectively increased the influence of prose-
cutors and law enforcement officers over sentencing decisions and
thus gave rise to its own disparities." Not surprisingly, recent stud-
ies have found that prosecutors circumvent the Guidelines on a
regular basis through their charging and plea bargaining deci-
sions." Sentencing inequities have also plagued state regimes that
structured sentencing discretion too rigidly."' Especially where
states superimposed mandatory sentencing statutes onto their
"' See Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal Sen-
tencing Policy; or, Confessions of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
1001, 1019 (2001); Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 838-39.15 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 4, at 64.
"" See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 341 (criticizing the Guidelines for exacting
"a high price in terms of the integrity of the criminal justice process, in terms of hu-
man life and the moral capital of the system" while yielding "arbitrary results");
Weinstein, supra note 4, at 366 (criticizing the Guidelines for promoting a "bureau-
cratic mentality" that denies each defendant's identity as a "unique human being");
Collina, supra note 6 (arguing that mandatory sentences have favored the prosecu-
tion).
107 See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 915-18; Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 834-35.
""See Bowman & Heise, supra note 3, at 1046; Schulhofer, supra note 5, at 841-42.
"9 Studies of the plea bargaining process have shown that evasion of the Guidelines
occurs in twenty to thirty-five percent of all guilty plea cases. Schulhofer, supra note 5,
at 845. Although prosecutorial manipulation of the Guidelines may be an attempt to
accommodate relevant differences among offenders that were ignored by the
Sentencing Commission, such flexibility is "of the worst sort, because it is invisible,
unstructured and uncontrolled." Id. at 870.
"" See Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient?: Overview of State Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 425,439-40 (2000).
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guideline systems, problems of excessive aggregation and prosecu-
torial manipulation of the sentencing process have emerged.
111
These inequities have not gone unnoticed by the public. There is
evidence that the adoption of mandatory sentencing laws in several
states was succeeded by an increase in jury nullification."' The ex-
perience with the Michigan Felony Firearms Statute is instructive.
In the period immediately following the enactment of the law,
which prescribed stiff mandatory sentences for felonies committed
with possession of a gun, less than ten percent of the defendants
tried for assault with a gun were convicted by a jury."3 Similarly,
the 1973 New York Rockefeller laws, mandating harsh sentences
for drug offenses, resulted in a decline in conviction rates from
eighty-six percent in 1972 to seventy-nine percent in 1976."' Like-
wise, Massachusetts's tough mandatory sentences for gun posses-
sion in the late 1970s prompted judges as well as jurors to nullify." '
In the 1990s, Californians nullified in cases where they knew that
the tough "three-strikes" law would apply." 6 More recently, ex-
pressing concern with harsh sentencing drug laws, South Dakotans
voted on an initiative to inform jurors of their right to nullify-
though the initiative was defeated."7
The decline of the scientific approach to punishment in the 1970s
and the dissatisfaction with more recent determinate sentencing
regimes demonstrate that serious problems plague the existing al-
ternatives to jury sentencing. Cognizant of the problems in deter-
minate sentencing regimes, two state legislatures have abolished
"' See generally Lowenthal, supra note 96 (discussing the perverse consequences
that result from the combination of sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing).
"2 Lanni, supra note 17, at 1784.
1 Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Not-So-Blissful Ignorance: Informing Jurors





supra note 17, at 1784 n.40 (citing Joint Comm. on N.Y. Drug Law Evalua-
tion, Final Report, The Nation's Toughest Drug Law: Evaluating the New York Ex-
perience 95 (1978)).
1' Id. at 1784.
116 Gail Diane Cox, Jurors Rise Up Over Principle and Their Perks, Nat'l L.J., May
29, 1995, at Al.
"' Adam Liptak, A State Weighs Allowing Juries To Judge Laws, N.Y. Times, Sept.
22, 2002, § 1, at 1. The initiative was defeated. See Joseph Perkins, No Gateway: The
Drug Czar Wins the Pot, Tulsa World, Nov. 10, 2002, at G6.
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their sentencing commissions,"8 another two abandoned the idea of
sentencing guidelines altogether,'19 and more have modified or re-
pealed their mandatory sentencing laws. It may be the perfect
time to reconsider the virtues of jury sentencing.
E. A Revival on the Horizon?
As shown in the previous Sections, the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries witnessed an increasing professionalization of
the criminal justice process. The trend away from jury trials and
jury sentencing seemed irreversible. So when the Supreme Court
recently invoked the Sixth Amendment to revive some of the
criminal jury's factfinding authority, most commentators were
taken aback. The seeming reversal of course makes it hard to pre-
dict the precise reach and trajectory of the Court's recent Sixth
Amendment holdings. The general direction, however, is clear-
towards greater jury participation in the legal process.
The first notable recent case indicating the Court's renewed in-
terest in the criminal jury is United States v. Gaudin."' In Gaudin,
the Court held that, in criminal cases, certain mixed questions of
law and fact, such as the materiality of a false statement, should be
submitted to a jury." The holding was especially significant be-
cause the history of the jury's role in determining mixed questions
of law and fact was ambivalent." Indeed, precedent supported the
"' Sentencing Guidelines Systems, supra note 93 (identifying Florida and Tennessee
as states that have abolished their sentencing commissions).
'
1
, Frase, supra note 110, at 427 (noting that Louisiana and Wisconsin have repealed
their sentencing guidelines).
2'The states that have already abandoned mandatory sentencing regimes for cer-
tain crimes include Louisiana, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, California, and
North Dakota. Other states, such as Massachusetts, New York, Alabama, Georgia,
New Mexico, and Idaho, are contemplating similar changes in their sentencing re-
gimes. Moran, supra note 2.
1' 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
. Id. at 522-23.
-Id. at 515-18. Another case in which the Court went out of its way to emphasize
the right to jury was United States v. Scheffer, in which the majority rested its holding
about the admissibility of polygraph tests partly on the ground that the jury's role in
making credibility determinations is diminished when it hears polygraph evidence.
523 U.S. 303, 309-14 (1998). The concurring Justices criticized the authors of the prin-
cipal opinion for overreaching to base the decision on the jury's prerogative to make
credibility determinations, noting that the Sixth Amendment rationale employed in
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view that judges should rule on questions of materiality. It would
not have been difficult, therefore, for the Court to place such mat-
ters entirely in judges' hands. Nonetheless, in a majority opinion
resonating with respect for the historic importance of the jury as a
political and legal institution, the Court affirmed the jury's pre-
rogative to pass on questions of materiality." The American jury,
the Court noted, has always been more than a mere factfinder. '
More recently, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that ju-
ries, rather than judges, must determine facts that trigger a sen-
tence above the statutory maximum for the underlying offense."
Two rationales, both grounded in the Sixth Amendment, moti-
vated the Court's opinion. The first rationale was historical: At
common law, the jury was entitled to decide all facts that exposed
the defendant to greater punishment "than that otherwise legally
prescribed."'27 Under an originalist reading, this conception of the
jury's powers was embodied in the Sixth Amendment and still de-
fines the scope of the right to a jury trial (although the meaning of
the phrase "legally prescribed" remains contested, since the ranges
of punishment prescribed today-mandatory minimums and guide-
line ranges-were unknown at common law)." The second ration-
ale espoused by the majority was pragmatic and reflected a belief
in the jury as a safeguard of constitutional liberties. The practice of
judicial factfinding abolished by Apprendi had become a common
feature of state and federal determinate sentencing regimes, and it
had dramatically shifted power from jurors to judges and prosecu-
tors.29 Concerned about governmental overreaching as a result of
the principal opinion was unnecessary to the holding. Id. at 318-19 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment).
124 Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 518-19.
"' See id. at 514.
126 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Court held that prior convictions are, however, an
exception to the rule and need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. Id.
at 488-90.
'2 Id. at 483 n.10.
'2 See Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406 (2002). For a compelling argument in
favor of interpreting "legally prescribed" punishment to include mandatory mini-
mums and certain guideline ranges, see Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The
Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing (2003) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).12 See Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons from
Criminal Trials and Sentencing, 32 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 419, 422 (1999) ("Judges were
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this shift, the Court required jury factfinding where a defendant
faced the danger of heightened stigma and loss of liberty."3
For some members of the Court, recent Sixth Amendment cases
have also served as a means to express a larger concern with the
fading of the jury as an institution.13 1 In Jones v. United States, the
predecessor to Apprendi, the majority noted that if judges were au-
thorized to find facts that raised maximum sentences, "the jury's
role would correspondingly shrink from the significance usually
carried by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of
low-level gatekeeping."'' 2 In the same vein, Justice Scalia observed
in Apprendi that statutes vesting judges with the authority to find
penalty-enhancing facts were fundamentally at odds with the tradi-
tional, constitutionally protected role of the jury:
What ultimately demolishes the case for the dissenters is that
they are unable to say what the right to trial by jury does guaran-
tee if, as they assert, it does not guarantee-what it has been as-
sumed to guarantee throughout our history-the right to have a
jury determine those facts that determine the maximum sentence
the law allows.'33
Even in the face of the high costs occasioned by this recent juris-
prudential shift,"M the Supreme Court has shown a commitment to
now to find facts under code-like categories, in the relative informality of sentencing
vith more determinate-and sometimes onerous-outcomes. As a result, it appeared,
and was to a large degree true, that the judge, not the jury, made more and more deci-
sions of consequence.").
"""Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 ("If a defendant faces punishment beyond that pro-
vided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not
others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the of-
fense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not-at the
moment the State is put to proof of those circumstances-be deprived of protections
that have, until that point, unquestionably attached."); see also Harris, 122 S. Ct. at
2424 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 103
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
1' See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2445 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
that "people's traditional belief in the right of trial by jury is in perilous decline").
'n 526 U.S. 227,243-44 (1999).
L Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'4 The trial-like factfinding mandated by Apprendi is clearly more costly and time-
consuming than judicial determinations at a sentencing hearing, see King & Klein, su-
pra note 25, at 1488, added to -which is the cost of thousands of appeals as a result of
the dramatic change in sentencing practices mandated by Apprendi.
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the core holding of Apprendi. In Ring v. Arizona, the Court over-
turned its own precedent to hold that only juries could make find-
ings of aggravating factors that are required for the imposition of
the death penalty." As in Apprendi, the majority's opinion focused
on the jury's traditional factfinding powers. Interestingly, the con-
curring opinions in Ring debated the issue of jury sentencing. Jus-
tice Scalia, while expressing "veneration for the protection of the
jury in criminal cases,"'36 wrote that the "judgment has nothing to
do with jury sentencing. What today's decision says is that the jury
must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor ex-
isted."' 37
Justice Breyer, however, found jury sentencing to be applicable
to the facts of the case. The reasons he cited included his "belief
that retribution provides the main justification for capital punish-
ment," and "the jury's comparative advantage in determining, in a
particular case, whether capital punishment will serve that end."' 3
Noting that the deterrent effect of capital punishment is far from
certain and that rehabilitation is "beside the point" in capital cases,
Justice Breyer would entrust only the jury with the grave choice
between life and death. 39 Jurors are "more attuned to 'the commu-
nity's moral sensibility"' because they "'reflect more accurately the
composition and experiences of the community as a whole.""' Im-
plicit in Justice Breyer's opinion is the claim that the jury's com-
parative advantage consists in the ability to legitimate the sentenc-
ing process."'
Justice Breyer's endorsement of jury sentencing in Ring is still an
outlier, however.'42 Moreover, it is confined to the capital punish-
ment context (although, as Part II of this Article shows, Justice
135 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002).
'3' Id. at 2445 (Scalia, J., concurring).
137 Id.
" Id. at 2446 (Breyer, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 2446-48.
"' Id. at 2447 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 481, 486 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).See id. at 2447-48.The central opinions on which Justice Breyer relied in his concurrence were Jus-
tice Stevens's dissents in Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515-26 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), and Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
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Breyer's reasoning largely translates to the non-capital context).
The diversity of opinions among Supreme Court Justices on the
jury's role in sentencing makes it difficult to assess how expansively
the Court will read the Sixth Amendment.'43
In Harris v. United States, the majority refused to extend the
Apprendi holding to facts that increase mandatory minimum sen-
tences.1" Five Justices agreed, however, that this would have been
the most logical application of Apprendi.'" The dissent argued that
both the historical and the practical rationales for Apprendi were
equally applicable to the facts in Harris. As Justice Thomas wrote,
"the original understanding of what facts are elements of a crime
was expansive" and would include facts that increase mandatory
minimums.1" Furthermore, "[a]s a matter of common sense, an in-
creased mandatory minimum heightens the loss of liberty and
represents the increased stigma society attaches to the offense.
Consequently, facts that trigger an increased mandatory minimum
sentence warrant constitutional safeguards."'47 No clear principle
thus seems to support the distinction that the majority in Harris
drew between mandatory sentencing minimums and maximums.
The reversal of course in Harris has also failed to offer a satisfac-
tory answer to other important questions about the jury's role in
the sentencing process. For example, why should facts increasing
the statutory maximum sentence be treated differently from facts
affecting the range under the Guidelines? As two appeals courts
have held, the maximum sentencing guideline ranges limit judges'
discretion in much the same way that statutory maximums do.1"
Consequently, where a fact triggers a mandatory minimum sen-
tence that is higher than the presumptive range imposed by the
' The record of the Court in the past decade has not been uniform in its support for
a wider jury authority. For example, in United States v. Watts, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of sentence enhancements made by judges, based on conduct of
which the jury had already acquitted the defendants. 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997). (After
Apprendi, such sentence enhancements can only be made within the applicable statu-
torX maximum.)
1 122 S. Ct. 2406,2418 (2002).
'
45 Id. at 2420, 2422.
, Id. at 2423-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2425 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'
4 United States v. Guevara, 277 F.3d 111, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Ramirez, 242 F.3d 348,351-52 (6th Cir. 2001).
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Guidelines, the logic of Apprendi mandates that this fact also be
determined by a jury.'49
More generally, the Apprendi-line of cases fail to address the
question of why juries should be allowed to determine facts di-
rectly bearing on sentencing, but be kept in the dark about the ac-
tual consequences of their findings. In most states, and at the fed-
eral level, juries are entrusted with the responsibility of deciding
between life and death; yet even after Apprendi, they are often de-
nied the power to decide between five years and life imprisonment.
The current restriction on informing jurors of the way in which
their decision influences the sentence may also adversely affect de-
fendants. As Justice Breyer has implied in his opinions, the scheme
endorsed in Apprendi poses a difficult conundrum for defendants.
They can argue they are innocent, thereby forfeiting their chance
to argue about the facts affecting their sentence (for example, the
drug quantity at issue). Alternatively, they can put forth evidence
about sentencing factors, thereby effectively conceding their guilt.
The end result of these recent Supreme Court opinions is intel-
lectual and practical confusion. Juries today determine some, but
not other, facts relevant to sentencing, without a principled distinc-
tion between these categories. They are given the power to influ-
ence a defendant's sentence, but not told how their decision im-
pacts the sentence. As the following Sections show, jury sentencing
offers a road out of the confusion and competing rationales created
by the recent Sixth Amendment opinions. This does not mean that
the Court should find that jury sentencing is constitutionally man-
dated. Rather, it calls on legislatures to resolve the tensions in the
Court's recent rulings and to engage juries both at the trial and
sentencing stages. Such legislation would be true to the spirit that
motivated Apprendi, Ring, and Gaudin, as well as to the historical
understanding of American juries' authority.
II. THE SENTENCING JURY AS A DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION
The near disappearance of jury sentencing over the last few dec-
ades has not been healthy for American democracy. Strictly speak-
ing, the regimes that have replaced jury sentencing are not anti-
149 Guevara, 277 F.3d at 119; Ramirez, 242 F.3d at 351-52.
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democratic-they were approved and to some extent designed by
legislatures. Yet an examination from the perspective of delibera-
tive democracy shows that citizens have lost something important
by abolishing sentencing juries. First, as the role of the jury has re-
ceded, in Justice Souter's words, to "low-level gatekeeping," the
criminal justice system has become ever more opaque to the aver-
age citizen. citizens have lost sense of the day-to-day workings of
the criminal justice system. Second, the professionalization of sen-
tencing has not lived up to its promise to make sentencing out-
comes more just and publicly acceptable. Instead, the inflexible
systems of sentencing have created inequities of their own.
A. Deliberative Democratic Theory
The theory of deliberative democracy, also known as discourse
theory,1"' extols the virtue of reasoned, face-to-face discussion in
political life.151 It usually defines itself in opposition to purely repre-
sentative models of democracy. It posits that the aggregation of in-
dividual preferences through voting, though often necessary, is not
always the best way to settle political disputes. 2 Majoritarian poli-
tics is, therefore, not the definition of democracy. It is better un-
derstood as a practical final decisionmaking process that should not
replace-and should be complemented by-deliberation on the is-
sues.
153
Deliberative democracy is better suited to some contexts than to
others. While scientific and technical issues might be better left to
panels of experts, deeply contested moral and political issues are
usually proper subjects for democratic deliberation." Similarly,
problems that call for individualized, case-by-case assessment are
" See Jfirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse
Theory of Law and Democracy 278-79 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
"' See Maeve Cooke, Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy, 48 Pol. Stud.
947, 947 (2000).
1 See Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age
145-48 (1984); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for
Democratic Reform 6-9 (1991).
"' Cf. Barber, supra note 152, at 198 (observing that majoritarianism is "a tribute...
to our inability to create a politics of mutualism that can overcome private interests").
" See Bernard Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, 15 Pol. Theory
338,353-54 (1987).
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often better decided through small-scale deliberation than through
the mechanical application of a general policy.
Certain arrangements are particularly conducive to effective de-
liberation. Openness to new ideas is one of the central tenets of de-
liberative democratic theory.' Discourse theory presumes that in-
dividual preferences "may be altered in the light of new
perspectives" and that they should be seen primarily as starting
points for discussion.156 When individuals are willing to reconsider
their positions, consensual outcomes are achieved much more eas-
ily. This is the insight behind the "ideal speech situation," which is
a cornerstone of deliberative democracy: Unconstrained delibera-
tion, in which "no force except that of the better argument is exer-
cised," can overcome private and strategic interests and lead to
consensual decisions.'57 As will be discussed, jury deliberations ar-
guably approach the ideal speech situation.'
Inclusivity is also a critical component of deliberative democratic
theory. Citizens of all social backgrounds are invited to bring their
ideas into the debate. Deliberative democracy works by "sub-
ject[ing] every pressing issue to continuous examination and possi-
ble reformulation... [and] scrutiniz[ing] what remains unspoken,
looking into the crevices of silence for signs of an unarticulated
problem, a speechless victim, or a mute protester.""5 9 Valid and le-
gitimate decisions are more likely to be made by a process that en-
gages members of all groups affected by the outcome. Deliberative
forums must, therefore, seek to be inclusive and "actively encour-
age or solicit previously excluded constituencies."'" If we apply this
insight to jury decisionmaking, we can easily see the importance of
the jury selection process. 6'
'55 Bert van den Brink, The Tragedy of Liberalism: An Alternative Defense of a Po-
litical Tradition 116 (2000).
"6 Id. at 110.
Jtirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis 108 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1973).
See Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government: Toward a
Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1417, 1449
(1997) ("Jury deliberations.., come closer to [the ideal speech situation] than most
other social decision making processes do.").
"' Barber, supra note 152, at 182.
", Jack Knight & James Johnson, Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility
of Democratic Legitimacy, 22 Pol. Theory 277,289 (1994).
16' See infra Section IV.F.
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Democratic deliberation has three distinct advantages: (1) It
transforms preferences to advance common interests;62 (2) it le-
gitimates the final result;63 and (3) it revitalizes and improves po-
litical life as a whole.
The first advantage of deliberative democracy is that, by promot-
ing dialogue among a range of constituencies, it is likely to produce
more informed judgments. It offers "the conditions whereby actors
can widen their own limited and fallible perspectives by drawing on
each other's knowledge, experience and capabilities."'' " Thus one
participant may bring to the table solutions or arguments that had
not occurred to others. In sentencing discussions, for example,
some jurors will emphasize the defendant's chances of rehabilita-
tion, while others will be more concerned about the message that
the sentence sends to the community at large. These jurors learn
from each other in the process of deliberation and perhaps reach
solutions that would not have occurred to them individually.65 De-
liberative results are also more informed in that they are better
targeted to the individual case. In the context of sentencing, case-
by-case deliberation can combine insights about the general and
the specific-about the workings and needs of the sentencing sys-
tem as a whole, as well as about the individual defendant's charac-
ter and motivation.
The second major argument for deliberation is that it is more
likely to engender legitimate decisions. Discourse theory makes the
ambitious claim that legitimate outcomes can be achieved through
deliberation, even in the absence of a universally accepted code of
"2 See Habermas, supra note 150, at 107, 119.
'' See Jtirgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society 50-68
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979) (arguing that deliberation is a means for discovering
truth); id. at 186, 188 (arguing that legitimacy requires that collective decisions be
criticized and defended through reasoned arguments); Carlos Santiago Nino, The
Constitution of Deliberative Democracy 129-34 (1996) (arguing that group delibera-
tion is more likely to produce correct outcomes); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thomp-
son, Democratic Disagreement, in Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and
Disagreement 243, 247 (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999) (arguing that "laws that are
adopted after mutual consideration of conflicting moral claims are more likely to belegtimate").
(4 Graham Smith & Corinne Wales, Citizens' Juries and Deliberative Democracy,
48 Pol. Stud. 51, 53-54 (2000).
"'See id. (citing James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in Deliberative De-
mocracy 44,49 (Jon Elster ed., 1998)).
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moral norms. Democratic discourse urges the revision of individual
preferences to produce consensus-based outcomes. It is in the striv-
ing for this consensus that legitimacy is created, because truth and
validity in political decisions are fundamentally products of human
interaction." Because the deliberating group hears and considers
diverse opinions and remains free to choose among them, the re-
sult carries legitimacy, even when the outcome does not satisfy all
points of view.'67
Finally, the transformative power of deliberation extends be-
yond the actual decisions made. Deliberative forums serve democ-
racy more broadly in that they impart a sense of political purpose
on the participants. By engaging ordinary citizens in government,
deliberative democracy gives these citizens confidence about their
ability to influence political decisions and thus increases their will-
ingness to participate in politics even after the end of their jury
service. Face-to-face deliberation thus reinforces the very skills and
qualities on which it thrives."
The potential of face-to-face deliberation to educate and engage
people in political affairs and teach them about the main political
(or, in the case of juries, legal) issues of the day was well-
understood by early democratic theorists such as Mill '69 and Toc-
queville."7° As discussed in Part I, it was promoted by Anti-
Federalists in the early republic. The belief that close political de-
liberation among citizens would invigorate democratic life unites
"
6Primus, supra note 158, at 1447 ("[Political knowledge] is made communally...
and cannot be derived by individuals, no matter how intelligent or well-intentioned.")
(citation omitted).
,
67 Manin, supra note 154, at 359.
SAs Mark Warren points out:
[D]emocracy works poorly when individuals hold preferences and make judg-
ments in isolation from one another, as they too often do in today's liberal de-
mocracies. When individuals lack the opportunities, incentives, and necessities
to test, articulate, defend, and ultimately act on their judgments, they will also
be lacking in empathy for others, poor in information, and unlikely to have the
critical skills necessary to articulate, defend, and revise their views.
Mark E. Warren, What Should We Expect from More Democracy?: Radically De-
mocratic Responses to Politics, 24 Pol. Theory 241,242 (1996).
" John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in On Liberty
and Other Essays 205, 254-55 (John Gray ed., 1991).
170 1 Tocqueville, supra note 57, at 285 (noting that the jury is "one of the most effi-
cacious means for the education of the people which society can employ").
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contemporary political theory with the liberal democratic ideas
that inspired the Framers. Furthermore, studies of the relationship
between jury service and overall political participation confirm the
intuitions of deliberative democrats.1
B. Deliberative Democracy and Sentencing
Deliberative democracy is not a very efficient or effective way to
settle technical or highly specialized problems. Complex engineer-
ing, economic, or medical questions are probably better left to ex-
perts-though civil juries frequently choose between the opinions
of competing experts. Criminal law, however, is not generally a
highly technical field, and sentencing is even less so. Rather, sen-
tencing debates usually entail a conflict between opposing norms
and values, a weighing of moral judgment in the context of specific
facts. These are the conflicts that deliberative democratic theory
suggests are best resolved through face-to-face conversation.
The perennially debated questions of sentencing concern the
underlying purposes of punishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, and
retribution. Each purpose emphasizes different values, such as the
extent to which offenders are morally responsible for the crimes
they have committed and the extent to which they can be rehabili-
tated. Both public opinion pollsi" and legislative policy" indicate
that no model of punishment has secured a dominant place in sen-
tencing debates. As John Dryzek observes, "[e]ach [model of pun-
ishment] can be backed or undermined by empirical studies that
are unlikely to convince adherents of different discourses. Each is
entwined with ideological positions taken by politicians."174
It is possible to judge how deliberative institutions-such as jury
sentencing-fit with each model of punishment. Thus critics of jury
171 See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
1 Mark Warr, Public Perceptions and Reactions to Violent Offending and Victimi-
zation in 4 Understanding and Preventing Violence: Consequences and Control 1, 52
(Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994) ("[T]here is no single dominant
ideology of punishment among the U.S. public. When asked, individuals commonly
invoke or support more than one theory of punishment, and no one theory appears to
dominate public thinking about punishment.").
17 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
" John S. Dryzek, Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy, 29 Pol.
Theory 651, 658 (2001).
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sentencing might point out that it is inconsistent with deterrence "5
or rehabilitation"' aims. Conversely, advocates could point to its
compatibility with a retributivist model of punishment." From a
deliberative democracy point of view, the value of jury sentencing
lies in mediating, through a conversation across rival discourses,
among different aims and models of punishment.78 As long as the
normative debate on punishment purposes persists, therefore, de-
mocratic deliberation on a case-by-case.basis remains the best way
to achieve consensual and publicly acceptable sentencing deci-
sions.'79
Deliberation not only produces legitimate sentencing decisions,
but is also well-suited to a process of fine-tuned and informed sen-
tencing decisionmaking. Sentencing requires careful consideration
of a host of factors. The sentencer-judge or jury-assesses the
harm caused by the offender to individual victims and to society at
175 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages 135-43 (2002) (finding that mock
study subjects overwhelmingly reject deterrence rationales for punishment and gener-
ally fail to perform basic deterrence calculations).
1 6 See Webster, supra note 17 (noting the scientific basis of the rehabilitation model
of sentencing and the inability of jurors to take rehabilitation aims into account).
'" Indeed, some advocates of jury sentencing have defended the practice on the
grounds that retribution has once again become the dominant justification for pun-
ishment in the United States and that juries are best able to fulfill retributivist aims.
See Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2446 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring); Morris
Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 Duke L.J. (forthcoming 2003) (manu-
script at 28-30, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association); Lanni, supra note
17, at 1779.
,78 This is one way in which jury sentencing fares better than one-judge sentencing.
Cf. Jtirgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justifi-
cation, in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action 43, 68 (Christian Len-
hardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990) ("[T]he justification of norms and
commands requires that a real discourse be carried out and thus cannot occur... in
the form of a hypothetical process of argumentation occurring in the individual
mind.").
"' Bernard Manin points out the value of deliberation in resolving conflicts between
values:
[N]o science can resolve this conflict [between opposing norms and values] in a
rigorous and necessary manner. However.... [s]ome values are more likely
than others to win the approval of an audience of reasonable people. It is im-
possible to demonstrate their soundness; they can only be justified .... The rela-
tive force of its justification can be measured only by the amplitude and the in-
tensity of approval it arouses in an audience of reasonable people.
Manin, supra note 154, at 353.
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large and then calibrates this assessment to take account of the of-
fender's blameworthiness:
[T]he moral character of the person who committed the crime...
is very much a part of the sentencing stage. Judges go beyond the
limited moral texture of the contemporary substantive criminal
law, expanding their inquiry so that they evaluate many features
of a case that touch on a broad measure of moral blameworthi-
ness.
Such fine-tuned analysis cannot be anticipated by a general law or
policy, or even by the rigid categories of the Guidelines. It would,
however, be the natural result of deliberation among an inclusive
group of jurors.'
Finally, the educative function of deliberative democracy is es-
pecially relevant to the sentencing process. Because sentencing to-
day is largely performed by judges and experts, the average citizen
has little knowledge and understanding of the sentencing process
and the sanctions available for particular crimes."n Encouraging
popular participation and deliberation in sentencing, therefore,
would be critical to increasing public awareness about punishment
objectives and options.
C. The Jury as a Model Deliberative Democratic Body
Because deliberative democracy places much emphasis on the
process by which decisions are made, institutional arrangements
are of central concern to the theory. Accordingly, juries have been
mentioned in passing in many accounts of deliberative democ-
racy." Nonetheless, few authors have discussed in detail the extent
to which existing legal juries embody deliberative ideals."
' Wheeler et al., supra note 78, at 87.
' See Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2447 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[T]he jury remains uniquely
capable of determining whether, given the community's views, capital punishment is
appropriate in the particular case at hand."); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct.
2242, 2253-54 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[J]uries are.., better suited than
courts in evaluating and giving effect to the complex societal and moral considera-
tions that inform the selection of publicly acceptable criminal punishments.").
""See Loretta J. Stalans & Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay
Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing, 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 199 (1990).
' Fishkin, supra note 152, at 87-90; Smith & Wales, supra note 164, at 55.
"' A notable exception is Primus, supra note 158.
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Deliberative democratic scholars have celebrated the public
sphere generally, and voluntary associations specifically, as the fa-
vored forums of deliberation."' Detractors have pointed out, how-
ever, that deliberative democracy has limited applicability to the
context of increasingly specialized political systems and large-scale,
multicultural political communities.'86 Contemporary liberal de-
mocracies allow little face-to-face deliberation among citizens of
diverse backgrounds and views, and decisions are usually made in
speech situations that are far from ideal: "In modern socie-
ties ... public deliberation is... largely mediated, with professional
communicators rather than ordinary citizens talking to each other
and to the public through mass media of communications.' If it is
true that the modern public sphere furnishes little space for genu-
ine deliberation among citizens, advocates of deliberative democ-
racy have to think harder about alternative institutions where de-
liberation might flourish.
In this dark picture of contemporary politics as devoid of oppor-
tunities for citizen-to-citizen deliberation, the jury stands out as a
precious exception. The American jury is the quintessential delib-
erative democratic body. Courts and commentators have on nu-
merous occasions affirmed the deliberative ideal that the jury is
supposed to embody-"face-to-face deliberation in which juries
[a]re asked to bracket narrow loyalty to their own group and join
with others in search of norms whose power lies in the ability to
persuade across group lines."'" Certain features of juries are par-
ticularly conducive to democratic deliberation. Random sampling,
9 Habermas, supra note 150, at 356-59 (arguing that processes of decisionmaking in
the central political institutions should be guided by "communication flows" originat-
ing in the public sphere, and that a vibrant civil society "embedded in liberal patterns
of political culture" is central to the success of deliberative politics); John Dryzek,
Ecology and Discursive Democracy: Beyond Liberal Capitalism and the Administra-
tive State, 3 Capitalism Nature Socialism 3, 34 (1992) (arguing that the rejuvenation
of civil society is an essential component of deliberative politics).
"6 See Michael Walzer, Deliberation, and What Else?, in Deliberative Politics: Es-
says on Democracy and Disagreement, supra note 163, at 58, 68 ("Deliberation is not
an activity for the demos... 100 million of them, or even 1 million or 100,000 can't
plausibly 'reason together."').
1 Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates?: Mass Media in Modern Democracy 1
(1996).
"s Abramson, supra note 46, at 192 (discussing Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972) and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972)).
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together with a robust jurisprudence prohibiting racial, ethnic, or
gender-based discrimination in jury selection, promotes the inclu-
sivity of the jury."* In addition, the unanimity requirement-
allowing a minority veto-encourages thorough deliberation and
careful consideration of all points of view.9 ' Sequestration and se-
crecy also facilitate unconstrained deliberation: Away from the
public gaze, jurors are more willing to relax their preferences in
light of reasoned discussion. Finally, the small size of the juries en-
courages substantive debate, "reduces the scope for demagogy and
allows all speakers to be heard.''.
Studies of jury behavior confirm the notion that sustained delib-
eration leads to some revision of preferences and to more informed
judgments. Research on non-legal, citizens' juries (in which indi-
viduals from different social backgrounds spent several days dis-
cussing one or more public policy issues) has shown that "'jurors
almost always change their minds during the sessions, as they be-
come [sic] more involved with the issues."' l Researchers have also
remarked on the competence and commitment to deliberation with
which citizen jurors approached their task."
As for actual legal juries, researchers have found that in only ten
to eleven percent of the cases in which the jury agrees on a ver-
dict" does the jury's final verdict differ from the outcome of the
pre-deliberation majority vote.95 Even this number, however,
"' See infra note 335 and accompanying text.
""'Abramson, supra note 46, at 199-200 (discussing studies showing that the una-
nimity requirement promotes more robust and longer deliberations). It is possible to
design non-deliberative juries: In Brazil, instead of deliberating, jurors are individu-
ally polled in writing at the end of the trial, and the majority prevails. Id. at 205 n.94.I1 Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in Deliberative Democracy 97,
109 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
.Smith & Wales, supra note 164, at 60 (quoting John Stewart et al., Citizens' Juries
25(1994)).
' Id. at 61.
1 4Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury, 487-88 nn.12-13 (1966)
(finding that five percent of jury deliberations result in "hung juries"). Later studies
have found about three percent of hung juries at the federal level, and somewhat
higher percentages in particular states and localities. Nancy Jean King, The American
Criminal Jury, 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 41, 60 (1999) (citing Michael J. Saks, What
Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About Jury Decisions?, 6 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 40
(1997)).
195See Kalven & Zeisel, supra note 194, at 488; Maria Sandys & Ronald C. Dillehay,
First-Ballot Votes, Predeliberation Dispositions, and Final Verdicts in Jury Trials, 19
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means that in close to 20,000 cases a year, discussion transforms the
preferences of the majority of jurors.'96 Studies of mock juries have
also shown that deliberating jurors exhibit a somewhat higher level
of reasoning than individuals who do not deliberate: Deliberating
jurors are "more aware of alternative theories and evidence that
did not support their selected verdict" and match evidence to al-
ternative verdict options more systematically.'" Other studies have
shown that jury-level memory and comprehension of the evidence
and the judge's instructions is significantly better than that of indi-
vidual jurors, largely due to deliberation.9 ' Research has thus con-
firmed the insight of discourse theory that group deliberation is
more likely to result in accurate factfinding: "The view of the evi-
dence produced by deliberation processes is invariably more com-
plete and more accurate than the typical individual juror's rendi-
tion of the same material."'"
Given the unique democratic structure and function of the jury,
it is not surprising to find that the public perceives juries to be
fairer than the judicial system in general." The numbers are im-
Law & Hum. Behav. 175, 188 (1995). Kalven and Zeisel also reported that in only
twelve percent of cases is the jury initially unanimous for acquittal and in only nine-
teen percent for conviction, inviting the conclusion that deliberation is "a process of
reaching consensus from positions of initial disagreement." Kalven & Zeisel, supra
note 194, at 488.
' Abramson, supra note 46, at 251 (estimating that there are about 160,000 jury tri-
als in federal and state courts per year).
197Monica L. McCoy et al., The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors' Reasoning
Skills, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 557, 570 (1999).
" See Reid Hastie et al., Inside the Jury 80-81 (1983); Shari Seidman Diamond &
Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instruc-
tions, 79 Judicature 224, 230 (1996) (reporting that deliberation increases juror com-
prehension of factual issues); Amiram Elwork et al., Towards Understandable Jury
Instructions, 65 Judicature 432, 442-43 (1982) (reporting that deliberating jurors per-
formed seventeen percent better than non-deliberating jurors on a comprehension
test of legal instructions and thirty-eight percent performed better when instructions
were simplified).
,99 Hastie et al., supra note 198, at 230.
" Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens' Perceptions of the
Criminal Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy and Efficiency, 12 Law & Hum. Behav.
333, 338 tbl.2 (1988) (finding that 68.5% of random phone survey participants per-
ceive juries to be fairest, while 22.5% perceive judges to be fairest, and 9% have no
preference); Julian V. Roberts & Loretta J. Stalans, Crime, Criminal Justice, and Pub-
lic Opinion, in The Handbook of Crime & Punishment 31, 47 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1998) (noting that although certain high-profile cases have led to periods of discon-
tent, the general public continues to support the jury system based on its perceived
[Vol. 89:311348
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pressive: Robert J. MacCoun and Tom R. Tyler found that ninety
percent of those surveyed believe the criminal jury system was
somewhat or very fair."' More recently, a survey by the American
Bar Association revealed that seventy-eight percent of national
survey respondents believe that the jury system is the fairest way to
determine guilt or innocence, and sixty-nine percent believe that
juries are the most important part of the U.S. justice system.2'
Importantly, jury service itself plays an important role in rein-
forcing these attitudes. A study by William R. Pabst, Jr. found that
ninety percent of those who had served as jurors were favorably
impressed with jury duty or felt more favorably toward it than they
had before their jury service. 3 Jury service also increases citizens'
fairness perceptions of the criminal justice system as a whole. A
study of jurors in Dallas County, Texas, reveals that "[j]urors rate
the [criminal justice] system as nearly 11% fairer than nonju-
rors."' 0  These findings support the idea that deliberation generates
legitimacy.
procedural fairness). At the same time, the confidence in judges is not as strong. See
Am. Bar Ass'n, Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System (1999), at
http://lvww.abanet.org/media/perception/perception32.html (Feb. 24, 1999) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association) (reporting that only about a third of the
respondents were extremely or very confident in judges). Finally, judges themselves
have great respect for juries. See John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 54 SMU
L. Rev. 1681, 1684 (2001) (citing a 2001 survey that found both state and federal
judges to be nearly unanimous in "believing that jurors did very well or moderately
well in actually reaching a just and fair verdict").
" ' MacCoun & Tyler, supra note 200, at 337. Furthermore, ninety-seven percent of
the participants in the survey viewed the jury system as "somewhat" or "very" impor-
tant as a national institution, despite awareness of the potential for error in jury trials.
Id.
02 Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 200, at http://wwwv.abanet.org/media/perception/perce
ption4O.html (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
203 William R. Pabst, Jr. et al., The Myth of the Unwilling Juror, 60 Judicature 164,
165 (1976); see also Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America,
1796-1996, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2673,2675 n.7 (citing "[s]ome studies that show that even
unwilling jurors come away with a good attitude about the jury system, [as well as]
others [that] seem to suggest that reluctant jurors may instead spread ill will about the
system long after they have completed service they feel was extorted from them");
Caroline K. Simon, The Juror in New York City: Attitudes and Experiences, 61
A.B.A. J. 207,211 (1975) (finding that one-third of New York jurors had a more posi-
tive attitude toward the jury system after jury service, with almost fifty percent not
having a change of attitude).
2"Daniel W. Shuman & Jean A. Hamilton, Jury Service-It May Change Your
Mind: Perceptions of Fairness of Jurors and Nonjurors, 46 SMU L. Rev. 449, 463
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Finally, research on juries tends to corroborate the hypothesis
that deliberation will promote civic engagement more generally.
John Gastil reports, with respect to criminal juries, that "citizens
who served on a jury that reached a verdict were more likely to
vote in subsequent elections than were those who served as alter-
nates or sat on criminal juries that were dismissed or dead-
locked." 5 Studies of citizens' juries show even more encouraging
results-that not only a consensual outcome, but also mere delib-
eration, favorably changes jurors' attitudes toward political activ-
ity. The evidence from these experiments reveals that some "jurors
are more civically active long after the jury process has ended."2"
D. Juries vs. Legislatures, Agencies, and Judges
Because of their deliberative capacity and democratic makeup,
juries are better situated than other political institutions to perform
the sensitive tasks of deciding between contested sentencing goals
and applying the law with due regard for the individual circum-
stances of each offender. In these respects, juries have a significant
advantage over legislatures, agencies, and judges.
As democratically elected institutions, legislatures bring to the
sentencing process the authority to articulate sentencing goals and
policies that reflect the majority will. While legislatures are also
well situated to make difficult choices among opposing moral and
ideological viewpoints, the experience with the Sentencing Reform
Act shows that the political will for a clear choice is often lacking.
Instead, the decision is often delegated to agencies that lack the
representativeness and democratic origin of legislatures.
Even when legislators mandate a clear direction, they cannot
calibrate statutes to cover every distinct factual situation. Creating
(1992). Daniel Shuman and Jean Hamilton qualified their findings, however, noting
that
"[t]he process of selecting jurors and the dynamics of participating in a jury de-
cision may independently contribute to the different perceptions of jurors and
nonjurors. In the process of selecting jurors, prospective jurors who are seen as
harboring views that the system is unfair may be more likely to be excluded
from the jury."
Id. at 469-70.
' See John Gastil, Is Face-to-Face Citizen Deliberation a Luxury or a Necessity?,
17 Pol. Comm. 357, 359 (2000).
. Smith & Wales, supra note 164, at 60 (citations omitted).
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an agency to translate broad legislative directives into more de-
tailed rules is a common response to the problem of insufficient
specificity. In the context of sentencing, however, agency regula-
tions (the Guidelines) have been an inadequate substitute for indi-
vidualized moral judgment, particularly because of the lack of sci-
entific or social consensus on the purposes and functions of
sentencing. 7
Where morality and politics are an essential component of sen-
tencing decisions, juries are better positioned than legislatures and
agencies to exercise sentencing functions. As a democratic institu-
tion, the jury has the legitimate authority to make difficult value
judgments-an authority that agencies lack. Jurors can also render
case-specific sentencing decisions that are outside the capabilities
of legislatures. If jurors are properly informed about average sen-
tencing practices and instructed to apply flexible sentencing guide-
lines, their case-specific decisions can also avoid the unwarranted
disparities that plagued indeterminate sentencing before 1984.
Discourse theory suggests that the jury has yet another advan-
tage over legislatures, an advantage that distinguishes deliberative
from representative institutions. The "majority will" expressed
through the aggregation of votes and through public opinion is of-
ten very different from the decision that citizens would make when
given the opportunity to consider an individual case and to delib-
erate about it." Barry Friedman has criticized the "erroneous as-
sumption... that such a thing as 'majority will' exists to legitimate
decisions of the 'representative' branches."2 9 Citizens rank their
preferences on a continuum, "and those preferences are often fluid
and relative, contingent upon possible and likely alternatives, or
upon information and discussion.""21 As Justice Stevens remarked
in one of his recent dissents, "[v]oting for a political candidate who
vows to be 'tough on crime' differs vastly from voting at the con-
clusion of an actual trial to condemn a specific individual to
death. 2 . Social science studies of popular attitudes toward sen-
2.l See supra Sections I.C & I.D.
, See Lanni, supra note 17, at 1780.
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 638 (1993).
21,, Brown, supra note 64, at 1280 (citation omitted).
2!, Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tencing affirm the skepticism toward decisions made merely by ag-
gregating votes or following general public opinion:
When asked about sentencing in the abstract, citizens report a
desire for harsher penalties, but when presented with detailed
descriptions of cases, these same citizens often suggest more le-
nient penalties than those meted out by judges and, in many
cases, than the mandatory minimum sanctions currently in force
in their jurisdictions.212
The difficulty of discerning a majority will and providing legisla-
tion or guidelines detailed enough to cover every individual case
has led many commentators to call for a return to a more discre-
tionary judicial sentencing.213 In the times of discretionary sentenc-
ing, judges "considered a wide variety of aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors relating to the circumstances of both the offense and the
offender. '214 At first glance, judges seem well positioned to make
sentencing decisions; the long tradition of judicial sentencing in
most states and at the federal level presents an easy argument for
returning sentencing discretion to judges. The original reasons for
the Sentencing Reform Act and the aforementioned insights from
deliberative democracy, however, offer a good counterargument to
calls for judicial sentencing.
In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress shifted discretion from
judges to the Commission in the name of reducing unwarranted
disparities in sentencing. Sentencing reform proponents objected
to judges meting out disparate sentences single-handedly, with few
checks on their power. As the staunchest critic of the old regime,
Judge Marvin Frankel, wrote: "[T]he almost wholly unchecked and
sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences
are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion
to the rule of law.' ' 215 Judges are often appointed for long terms or
even for life and, even when they are elected, they are perceived as
elitist and not representative of the popular will. Therefore, the
possibility that the political and moral outlook of a judge would in-
212 Lanni, supra note 17, at 1781.
213 See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 4, at 7-8; Alschuler, supra note 5, at 945;
Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 339.
214 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 4, at 14.
2 15Frankel, supra note 86, at 5.
[Vol. 89:311
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice
fluence the years served by a criminal defendant greatly under-
mines the legitimacy of the sentencing process. 6 In a line of pro-
jury cases, the Supreme Court outlined another reason for distrust-
ing judges-the possibility that they may be "overconditioned" and
may not be able to appreciate the complexities and moral nuances
of individual cases."7 Judges themselves have admitted to this ten-
dency. 
2 18
Juries, in contrast, bring both the legitimacy and the fresh per-
spective of a body made up of ordinary citizens. As Justice Breyer
recently noted, this gives juries a comparative advantage over
judges: "Even in jurisdictions where judges are selected directly by
the people, the jury remains uniquely capable of determining
whether, given the community's views, capital punishment is ap-
propriate in the particular case at hand., 219 Studies of the public
perception of the fairness of judges and juries also reveal that citi-
zens overwhelmingly rate jurors as fairer decisionmakers in crimi-
nal trials.' Thus, giving juries a larger role seems to be the proper
response to concerns about the legitimacy of the sentencing sys-
tem. Finally, jury sentencing has the unique advantage of engaging
citizens in legal affairs and educating them about the law. As the
Supreme Court recognized in a recent case, jury service is "for
most citizens.., their most significant opportunity to participate in
the democratic process.""
216 Brown, supra note 64, at 1286-87 ("The inability to easily remove judges from the
bench gives rise to the fear that an 'eccentric' will remain on the bench once ap-
pointed. And because trial judges sit alone, the possibility that any one person's
judgment will be idiosyncratic and not countered by others adds to the fear of an indi-
vidual judge's eccentricity.").
217 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see also Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (stating that juries protect against the "perhaps overcondi-
tioned or biased response of a judge").2 1 Weninger, supra note 17, at 19-20 (reporting that, vhen asked to compare jury to
judge sentencing, a few judges noted the problem of judicial callousness that results
from overexposure to criminal cases).2" Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2447 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
,,' See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
"2 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,407 (1991).
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III. JURY SENTENCING AND ITS CRITICS
Despite its democratic credentials, jury sentencing is practiced in
only six states today.f2 Critics of jury sentencing contend that ju-
ries' lack of expertise and experience result in disparate and sys-
tematically biased sentences and heavy financial burdens on the
judicial system. As this Part argues, the shortcomings of sentencing
juries have been greatly exaggerated in comparison to the short-
comings of the alternatives. Moreover, to the extent that any of
these alleged defects are present in current jury sentencing re-
gimes, they are relatively easily mitigated; the final Part outlines a
model sentencing regime that would avoid or at least minimize
their effect.
A. A Sketch of a Prototypical Jury Sentencing Regime
To understand the arguments of jury sentencing critics, it is use-
ful to sketch out how jury sentencing currently functions in the
states where it exists. In all six jury sentencing states, the same jury
that decides the guilt or innocence of the defendant also makes de-
cisions about punishment. As is the case with ordinary trial juries,
the pool of jurors is drawn randomly, and in most cases, the se-
lected jurors have never before served on a jury. Four of the six
jury sentencing states bifurcate the criminal proceedings into a trial
and sentencing stage so that the jury hears evidence relevant to
sentencing only after it has already rendered a guilty verdict.m The
central goal of the bifurcated proceeding is to keep out character
evidence at the guilt stage, but to allow its introduction for sentenc-
ing purposes-when the character of the offender is at the center
of the proceedings. At the sentencing hearing, the parties are gen-
erally allowed to present a range of aggravating and mitigating evi-
22 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
mSee Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-101 (Michie Supp. 2001); Ky Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 532.055 (Michie 1999); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 2 (Vernon Supp.
2003); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-295.1 (Michie Supp. 2002). But see Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 557.036 (West 1999) ("The court shall instruct the jury as to the range of punish-
ment authorized by statute and upon finding of guilt to assess and declare the pun-
ishment as a part of their verdict... ."); Reed v. State, 657 P.2d 662 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1983) (holding that bifurcated trials are required under Oklahoma law only for
murder and habitual offender cases).
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dence, including the defendant's prior record and reputation in the
community."
Currently, juries do not have access to sentencing guidelines or
sentencing and probation statistics to help them arrive at a verdict
consistent with those rendered by other jurors for similar of-
fenses.' Instead, jurors are provided only with statutory maxi-
mums and minimums establishing a wide range of permissible sen-
tences. 6 Jury deliberation occurs in secret, and a unanimous
verdict is required. In some states, if the jurors cannot agree on a
sentence, the judge determines the punishment. 7 Indeed, in Vir-
ginia, jury sentencing is formally only advisory, and in Arkansas,
under certain circumstances, the judge is allowed to impose a more
lenient sentence than the one selected by the jury.' In all states,
jury sentencing occurs in only a small percent of the docketed
cases, because over ninety percent of cases are plea bargained; 9
and even where the defendant has the option of being sentenced by
a jury after a guilty plea,' this choice is, rationally, almost never
exercised in practice."l
" See infra Section IV.A.
2'- See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
226See infra Section IV.C.
"' See infra Section IV.D.
21 See id.
2" Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Felony Sentences in State
Courts, 1998, at 8-9 tbls.9-10 (2001).
'-'E.g., State v. McDonald, 137 P. 362 (Okla. Crim. App. 1914) (holding that where
the accused pleads guilty, the defendant can choose whether to submit the question of
punishment to the jury); Basaldua v. State, 481 S.W.2d 851, 853-54 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972) (interpreting Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § (3)(a)(1) (Vernon 1981)).
21 A guilty plea reflects a sentencing bargain with the prosecution, and defendants
are reluctant to jeopardize that bargain by submitting the sentencing to a jury. Some
may question the significance of the proposal for jury sentencing in light of the high
rate of plea bargained cases. Even if we accept the current high rates of plea bargain-
ing, jury sentencing after actual jury trials is still valuable for the following reasons:
(1) it serves as a benchmark for plea-bargained cases, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 158 (1968); John MacCormack, In Texas, Jury System Rules Justice, San
Antonio Express-News, Nov. 16, 1997, at G1 (citing prosecutor who says he uses jury
sentencing as a benchmark for his plea agreements); (2) it still fulfills the important
democratic and educative functions outlined in Part II; and (3) the low rate of jury
trials makes jury sentencing more feasible financially.
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B. The "Arbitrariness and Disparity" Argument
Perhaps the main criticism of sentencing juries is that their lack
of experience and expertise leads them to make decisions based on
a fragmented understanding of the sentencing process. Unable to
situate the case before them within the larger sentencing frame-
work, juries are said to render disparate judgments in similar cases
in violation of the basic principle of equality before the law. 2
Before reviewing the empirical data on jury and judge variability
in sentencing, it is worth noting that disparities in sentencing do
not necessarily reflect a defect in the system. Disparity is not equal
to arbitrariness. Disparate sentences may be evidence of the jury
taking proper account of the individual circumstances of each of-
fender and thus a sign of the virtues of jury sentencing. As the Su-
preme Court has noted, "a consistency produced by ignoring indi-
vidual differences is a false consistency."' 3 Disparity may also
reflect geographical differences in public attitudes toward a given
crime; while this notion may trouble some, it is not inconsistent
with age-old traditions of federalism and local self-government.
Empirical research on jury sentencing is still scarce, and thus the
data on jury sentencing disparities are inconclusive. The argument
that juries impose disparate sentences is most often based on anec-
dotes.' Only two isolated surveys-one from El Paso County and
the other from Dallas County, Texas-have found greater variabil-
ity in jury sentencing than in judicial sentencing. 5 At the same
time, two earlier studies of jury sentencing found no evidence of
systematic disparity in jury verdicts. 6 More support for the vari-
'32 See ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relat-
ing to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 44-46 (1968); Betts, supra note 17, at
372; Webster, supra note 17, at 228; Weninger, supra note 17, at 19; Wright, supra
note 17, at 1376-77.
'33 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
2' See Jouras, supra note 17, at 303-04; Kerr, supra note 17, at 109-10 (discussing
isolated cases where juries gave widely different sentences for similar crimes); Note,
Should the Jury Fix the Punishment for Crimes?, 24 Va. L. Rev. 459, 465 (1938)
(same).
"3 Webster, supra note 17, at 226; Weninger, supra note 17, at 30-31.
2' Lanni, supra note 17, at 1796 n.100 (discussing William A. Eckert & Lauri E. Ek-
strand, The Impact of Sentencing Reform: A Comparison of Judge and Jury Sentenc-
ing Systems 8-10 (1975) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Re-
view Association)) ("comparing sentences before and after Georgia introduced judge
sentencing and finding no evidence of systematic jury-sentencing disparity in any of
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ability argument comes from a recent mock study of jury awards of
punitive damages.' Even as it cites discrepancies among the jury
verdicts, however, the study finds remarkable consistency in the
normative judgments underlying the jury verdicts.n8
It is also useful to compare the record of juries to that of judges.
Research on judicial overrides of jury sentences in capital cases
suggests that judicial sentencing may itself result in unjustified dis-
parities, especially near elections and in politically sensitive cases."
The variation among sentences rendered for the same offenses by
different judges in the pre-Guidelines regime also attests to the
possibility that, in the absence of external constraints, judges may
be equally likely to bring personal and ideological considerations
into their verdicts,'f and when they do so, their opinions are not
challenged or mitigated by those of eleven other citizens.
the crime categories studied except aggravated assault"); id. (discussing Brent L.
Smith & Edward H. Stevens, Sentence Disparity and the Judge-Jury Sentencing De-
bate: An Analysis of Robbery Sentences in Six Southern States, 9 Crim. Just. Rev. 1, 4
(1984)) ("[F]inding a larger deviation from the mean in Alabama in the period of
judge sentencing than in the jury sentencing years, although the standard deviation in
all three jury states was higher than in the three judge-sentencing states studied.").
' Sunstein et al., supra note 175, at 31-32. But see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Ju-
ries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743
(2002) (finding only slightly higher variability in jury-assessed than in judge-assessed
punitive damages).
' Sunstein et al., supra note 175, at 31-32.
2' See, e.g., Carrie A. Dannenfelser, Burch v. State: Maintaining the Jury's Tradi-
tional Role as the Voice of the Community in Capital Punishment Cases, 60 Md. L.
Rev. 417, 438 (2001) (citing a study on Alabama overrides which found that "there is
a statistically significant correlation between judicial override and election years in
most of the counties where these overrides [took] place"); Michael Mello, The
Jurisdiction to Do Justice: Florida's Jury Override and the State Constitution, 18 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 923, 937-38 (1991) (noting that, between 1986 and 1991, the Florida Su-
preme Court reversed ninety-three percent of the judicial overrides of jury sentencing
in capital cases); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 477 n.17 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is doubtful that judicial sentencing
has worked to reduce the level of capital sentencing disparity; if anything, the evi-
dence in override cases suggests that the jury reaches the appropriate result more of-
ten than does the judge.").
"' See Vines v. Muncy, 553 F.2d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 1977) ("It must.., be recognized
that much of the same criticisms [of rendering disparate sentences] can be directed at
judge sentencing, which also represents the exercise of unfettered discretion, but on
the part of the judge, rather than the jury."); Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions"
on Life or Death-If They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Pat-
rick Higginbotham, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1067, 1085 (1991) ("[T]he uniquely moral
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To the extent that variability does exist in jury sentencing, its
roots may be no different than those identified in the federal sys-
tem prior to the Guidelines-that is to say, standardless sentencing
regimes.24' Studies of jury behavior in the punitive damages context
suggest two sources of variability and incoherence in jury verdicts,
and both of these could be minimized by providing juries with a set
of standards by which to assess individual sentences.
The first potential source of variability is the jurors' inability to
consistently match monetary awards (or years of imprisonment) to
normative judgments about the defendant's behavior.2 Even
where jurors agree amongst themselves about the extent of blame-
worthiness of the defendant, they often disagree about the appro-
priate sentence that should attach to what they all see as equally
blameworthy conduct. It is thus possible that defendant A would
receive a bigger fine than defendant B even though both juries A
and B would agree that B is more blameworthy than A. "3 Despite
this perceived problem of translating moral outrage into numbers
or years of jail, it remains true that the jurors' normative judgments
(their "punitive intents") are remarkably consistent.' Therefore, a
standard that aids jurors in anchoring their punitive intent to a par-
ticular dollar amount or sentence length could ensure sufficient
uniformity and predictability. "5
and emotional nature of the capital sentencing decision virtually ensures that not only
jurors but also judges will inject very personal considerations into their verdicts.").
"' Berger, supra note 240, at 1084 (arguing that arbitrariness in capital cases is a
function of standardless regimes rather than of jury sentencing).
242 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 Stan. L. Rev.
1153, 1155 (2002) ("Even when people show coherent and consistent moral intuitions.
they may show little consistency and coherence in translating those intuitions into
numbers, such as dollars of fines or years in jail.").
243 Id. at 1169.
' David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift 100 Colum.
L. Rev. 1139, 1141 (2000) (noting that "[w]ith respect to punishment ratings, juries
were neither more nor less consistent and predictable than the mean or median ju-
ror").
245 As Schkade et al. note, "[w]ith the dollar scale, the underlying problem is that
people are being asked to scale without a 'modulus,' that is, without a standard that
would help give meaning to various numbers on the scale." Id. at 1147-48. ("The key
point is that when a modulus is supplied, the variability greatly decreases .... [This
point] helps explain the disparities that led to the enactment of the Sentencing Guide-
lines; before the guidelines, judges were being asked, in effect, to scale without a
modulus...") id.
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The second source of incoherence, which is related to the first,
lies in the jurors' perceived inability to situate a sentence for a par-
ticular crime within the larger sentencing framework. 6 For exam-
ple, jurors may sentence money laundering very harshly and aggra-
vated assault less so, but if they saw the two cases at the same time,
the two sentences might be different. 7 It is worth noting, however,
that "even the most experienced judge must engage in isolated sen-
tencing decisions, and it is highly likely that without guidelines,
within-category coherence and global incoherence will be the re-
sult."2  The key, therefore, is to devise sentencing standards (for
example, statutory ranges or sentencing guidelines) that would en-
hance the coherence of jury sentencing decisions. At the same
time, one should be careful not to eviscerate the jury's deliberative
functions: "Coherence is important," but "it is not a trumping
value."249
The discussion of variability demonstrates one thing for certain:
The importance of providing jurors with more information, such as
sentencing statistics and guidelines, cannot be overstated. Histori-
cally, juries have had little, if any, information about the average
sentence and actual time served for different types of offenses.' 0 At
the same time, judges have availed themselves of pre-sentencing
reports, sentencing guidelines, and in some instances, reports of the
average sentencing and parole practices in their district or circuit."
Not surprisingly, virtually all of those who have criticized jury sen-
tencing for producing arbitrary sentences have focused their cri-
tiques on the lack of information available to the jury. 2
2
'
4 Sunstein et al., supra note 242, at 1158-59.
2 7 E-mail from Cass Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of
Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School, to Jenia Iontcheva, Bigelow Fellow
and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School (Oct. 8, 2002) (on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
21 Sunstein et al., supra note 242, at 1195.
2. Id. at 1203.
2" See infra Section IV.A.
2" See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 17, at 17 ("Pre-sentence investigation reports from
the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole inform the judge of where the defendant
falls within the sentencing guidelines. The report also informs the judge of any sen-
tence received by a co-participant in the same crime or series of crimes.").
2 See Betts, supra note 17, at 371; Jackson, supra note 17, at 17 ("Disparity in jury
sentencing is based upon the unique make-up, opinions, and experiences of each indi-
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Unwarranted disparities in jury sentencing are, therefore, largely
a function of the institutional context within which juries operate." 3
Mock jury studies confirm that providing jurors with information in
the form of reference sentences reduces the discrepancy between
juror and judge sentences.' As Part IV discusses in more detail,
thoughtful institutional design, such as a guidelines system, sen-
tencing statistics databases, and judicial review of jury sentences
can reduce and even eliminate arbitrary outcomes in jury sentenc-
ing.
C. The "Systematic Bias" Argument
Even if juries were consistent in their sentencing, they may still
be faulted for systematically rendering more lenient or harsher sen-
tences than are appropriate. For example, juries are thought to be
"more inclined to excuse a defendant because of his youth alone
than would be a judge." 5 In contrast, many defendants and crimi-
nal defense attorneys believe juries to be harsher sentencers than
judges."6 It is not clear that such bias in jury sentencing, if it in fact
exists, reflects an inability to assess the "correct" sentence. A jury
bias in favor of harshness may accurately reflect community senti-
ments-for example, that recidivists should be punished especially
vidual juror and the unfortunate lack of material information relevant to sentenc-
ing."); Linden, supra note 17, at 981.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
Yale L.J. 71, 117 (2000) (noting that "group polarization [which leads to inconsistent
jury verdicts] can be heightened, diminished, or possibly even eliminated by seem-
ingly small alterations in institutional arrangements").
See Michelle D. St Amand & Edward Zamble, Impact of Information About
Sentencing Decisions on Public Attitudes Toward the Criminal Justice System, 25
Law & Hum. Behav. 515,522 (2001).
2" LaFont, supra note 17, at 842.
In 2002, only 1.7% of Virginia criminal defendants who went to trial chose to be
sentenced by their jury. Va. Criminal Sentencing Comm'n 2002 Ann. Rep. 36 (2002).
Similarly, a high percentage of Virginia defense attorneys might still favor the aboli-
tion of jury sentencing in Virginia. A 1977 statewide survey found that 63% of Vir-
ginia's prosecutors opposed the abolition of jury sentencing, while 65% of the state's
criminal defense lawyers favored abolition. Report of the Subcomm. to Study Sen-
tencing for Va. State Crime Comm'n 2 (1977) [hereinafter Va. Sentencing Study].
(These poll numbers may be different today, since Virginia has since shifted to a bi-
furcated trial system, allowing jurors to receive more information at the sentencing
stage and removing the danger of prejudice against the defendant at the trial stage.)
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harshly. 7 Conversely, a perceived leniency on the part of juries
may really be a reflection of judicial harshness: As judges them-
selves have admitted, their daily exposure to sentencing and their
political ambitions might sometimes harden their outlooks on pun-
ishment."
Research on the question of systematic jury bias has provided
inconclusive answers. 9 Some studies have found that jurors are
generally more lenient than judges,' 6 and that deliberation pro-
duces substantial leniency effects. 6' At the same time, two studies
have found that jurors are consistently harsher than judges in im-
posing sentences,' and research in the context of punitive damages
suggests that deliberation often produces a shift in the direction of
severity."3 Yet other scholars have found no significant difference
in the severity of sentences imposed by juries versus those imposed
by judges. 6'
25 Weninger, supra note 17, at 34 (finding that repeat offenders were sentenced sig-
nificantly more harshly by juries than by judges).
2 " See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
2" See Lanni, supra note 17, at 1793-96.
2', See Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency
in Sentencing, 7 Behav. Sci. & L. 73, 74-81 (1989) (finding that mock jurors are as le-
nient or more lenient than judges); see also Smith & Stevens, supra note 236, at 34
(finding that average sentences in Alabama increased with the shift from jury to judge
sentencing, but suggesting other factors, such as an increase in punitiveness of public
opinion over time, likely contributed to the increase); Stalans & Diamond, supra note
182, at 206 (finding that poll respondents have more lenient sentence preferences than
the required minimum sentence for residential burglary).
"' See James H. Davis et al., The Decision Processes of 6- and 12-person Mock Ju-
ries Assigned Unanimous and Two-Thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 1, 9 (1975); Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in
Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors' Bias for Leniency, 54 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol.
21, 21-22 (1988) (citing studies showing that deliberation produces leniency effects);
Michael G. Rumsey, Effects of Defendant Background and Remorse on Sentencing
Judgments, 6 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 64, 67 (1976) (same); Laurence Severance et al.,
Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors Can Understand, 75 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 198,225 (1984) (same).
2 2Weninger, supra note 17, at 31-37; see also Va. Criminal Sentencing Comm'n,
supra note 256, at 36-38 (finding that jury sentences in 2002 were higher than the sen-
tences prescribed by sentencing guidelines (and given out by judges), but noting that,
unlike judges, juries were not aware of the guideline ranges).
.. Sunstein et al., supra note 175, at 43-44.
" See St Amand & Zamble, supra note 254, at 526; Eckert & Ekstrand, supra note
236, at 8-12.
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More disturbing are critiques concerning specific biases that af-
fect juries' judgments. For example, juries are accused of basing
their verdicts on irrelevant factors, such as the defendant's or coun-
sel's appearance, or more insidiously, the defendant's race or eth-
nicity.265 Several comprehensive studies of capital juries have found
racial bias in the decision to impose the death penalty.26 Although
some studies, controlling for case characteristics and prosecutorial
decisions, are inconclusive or find no racial disparities in jury sen-
tencing, the quality and amount of evidence in the other direction
warrants serious consideration by legislatures devising jury sen-
tencing regimes.
"6' LaFont, supra note 17, at 842.
'David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-
Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadel-
phia, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638 (1998) (finding that in Philadelphia, defendants con-
victed of killing white victims were more likely to be sentenced to death); William J.
Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman
Capital Statutes, 26 Crime & Delinq. 563 (1980); Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito.
Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: An Analysis of Post-Gregg
Outcomes, 7 Just. Q. 189, 189 (1990) (finding that, in Kentucky, blacks accused of kill-
ing whites were more likely to be charged with a capital crime and sentenced to die
than other homicide offenders).
267 Va. Sentencing Study, supra note 256, at 9 (finding no racial bias in jury sentenc-
ing in rape cases, but comparing sentencing only for "white-on-white" and "black-on-
black" crime); Arnold Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for the Georgia Death
Sentence, 18 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1327 (1985); Stephen P. Klein & John E. Rolph, Re-
lationship of Offender and Victim Race to Death Penalty Sentences in California, 32
Jurimetrics J. 33, 44 (1991) (controlling for case characteristics and finding no racial
disparities in capital jury sentencing in California); Dolores A. Perez et al., Ethnicity
of Defendants and Jurors as Influences on Jury Decisions, 23 J. Applied Soc. Psychol.
1249 (1993); Lanni, supra note 17, at 1799 (reviewing studies on racial bias in jury sen-
tencing and finding them inconclusive); see also Howard C. Daudistel et al., Effects of
Defendant Ethnicity on Juries' Dispositions of Felony Cases, 29 J. Applied Soc. Psy-
chol. 317 (1999) (finding that Hispanic majority juries in El Paso, Texas, systemati-
cally gave longer sentences to Anglo-American defendants, but that the converse was
not the case). Studies of other biases are similarly inconclusive. Compare Robert M.
Bray et al., The Effects of Defendant Status on the Decisions of Student and Com-
munity Juries, 41 J. Soc. Psychol. 256 (1978) (finding some influence of defendants'
social status on mock juries' sentencing decisions, but also finding that this influence
was largely a function of defendants' violation of social expectations by misusing abili-
ties associated with their status), with Rumsey, supra note 261 (finding that defen-
dants' social background did not influence mock juries' sentencing decisions).
26 See infra Part IV for suggestions on simple structural reforms that could constrain
disparities in noncapital jury sentencing.
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While the issue of racial bias is an important factor to consider in
evaluating jury sentencing, one must also be careful to compare the
record of juries to that of other decisionmakers in the criminal jus-
tice system. Research of capital juries tends to show that disparities
in sentencing associated with the race of the victim are as much if
not more the result of prosecutorial discretion.' The research also
fails to consider whether such biases are more or less prevalent
among juries than among judges. Yet numerous studies have found
prejudice on the bench 0 including at the sentencing stage.' Cer-
tainly, many judges themselves are not convinced of their unshak-
able objectivity.'m
Indeed, whatever biases judges and prosecutors bring to the ta-
ble, they are less likely to encounter opposing views and overcome
those biases in the course of their decisionmaking. Juries fare bet-
ter in this respect for two reasons. First, they are still more inclu-
sive than the ranks of state judges and prosecutors. As of 1990,
2 9 Abramson, supra note 46, at 228-29; see also Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of
Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1660, 1679-80 (1996) (re-
viewing Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America
(1995)) (citing numerous studies finding racial disparities resulting from unchecked
prosecutorial discretion).
'7 See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Jus-
tice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev.
553, 564-70 (1998) (reviewing a series of bench trial cases showing judicial factfinding
bias in favor of the prosecution); Ga. Supreme Court Comm'n on Racial & Ethnic
Bias in the Court System, Introduction to Let Justice Be Done: Equally, Fairly, & Im-
partially (1995), http:/wvw2.state.ga.us/courts/supreme/ceintro2.htm.
2,'Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal
Factors and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 733 (2001);
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representa-
tion on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 95, 102 & n.39, 103 & n.42 (1997) (citing a
1993 Minnesota Task Force Report, which found that state trial judges "unequally
sentenc[ed] similarly situated African American and white youths" and "credit[ed]
the testimony of white witnesses while failing to credit the testimony of comparable
African American witnesses").
'n Frankel, supra note 86, at 21-23.
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only 3.8% of all state court judges were African-American,2 3 and
the results were not very different in jurisdictions with large Afri-
can-American populations.274 Similarly, in 2000, African-Americans
represented only 4% of the attorneys in the criminal justice system,
while only 3 % were Hispanic. 5
Not only are jurors more representative in their makeup, but delib-
eration among them is likely to transform their individual biases.
Faced with fellow jurors of different races, genders, and ethnicity and
with a unanimity requirement, individuals are less likely to make bi-
ased remarks and more likely to put prejudices aside in light of rea-
soned discussion. Prejudice can be further constrained through sen-
tencing standards and judicial review. It is significantly more
difficult for a juror to justify her biased sentencing decision when
she knows that her number departs from the average sentence for
the same offense. And in the unlikely event that a jury reaches a
clearly arbitrary or biased decision, a judge can modify the verdict
in accordance with the sentencing standards.
D. The "Cost and Inefficiency" Argument
Commentators also criticize jury sentencing for imposing a
heavy administrative and financial burden on the judicial system.
Extending jury duty to the sentencing stage means an increase in
jury fees and in the amount of productivity lost to jury duty. More-
73 Barbara Luck Graham, Judicial Recruitment and Racial Diversity on State
Courts: An Overview, 74 Judicature 28, 32 (1990).27 Ifill, supra note 271, at 95-96 ("In New York State, for example, only 6.3% of the
state's judges were African American in 1991, although African Americans consti-
tuted 14.3% of the state's population. In Georgia, where 27% of the population is Af-
rican American, only 6% of the state's judges are African American.").
2" Ellis Cose, The Darden Dilemma, Newsweek, Mar. 25,2000, at 58.
276 See Richard R. Izzett & Walter Leginski, Group Discussion and the Influence of
Defendant Characteristics in a Simulated Jury Setting, 93 J. Soc. Psychol. 271, 271
(1974) (finding that discussion mitigates bias against unattractive defendants); Martin
F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing the Effects of Juror Bias, 36 J. Personality &
Soc. Psychol. 1443, 1451-52 (1978) (finding that deliberation reduces individual ju-
rors' bias with respect to the parties' lawyers); Jeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer,
Mock Jurors Versus Mock Juries: The Role of Deliberations in Reactions to Inadmis-
sible Testimony, 20 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 153, 160 (1994) (finding that jury
deliberation reduces extralegal biases of individual jurors); Jerry Shaw & Paul Skol-
nick, Effects of Prohibitive and Informative Judicial Instructions on Jury Decision-
making, 23 Soc. Behav. & Personality 319, 324 (1995) (finding that deliberation nulli-
fied reverse racial bias in jury verdicts).
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice
over, because juries sit only once, educating each new jury about
the sentencing system is costly. As one commentator has argued,
"[t]here is no logic in attempting to make each jury an expert in
sentencing and in complex sentencing laws when the system has
developed that expertise in [the] judiciary."'2 It is also expensive to
educate jurors properly about the meaning of the evidence before
them.27
The simplest response to this criticism is that the cost of jury
education is a small price to pay for the important democratic con-
tribution that the jury can make to the sentencing process. Fur-
thermore, informing members of the public about the conse-
quences of sentencing statutes passed by their representatives has
the independent value of advancing the ideals of transparency and
accountability. When one considers the significant resources al-
ready devoted to probation officer interviews and calibration and
appeals of guideline determinations, an opening hearing where the
same information is presented to a panel of citizens may not seem
as starkly inefficient by comparison."9 Finally, given the high per-
centage of cases that end with a plea bargain today, the costs of a
shift to jury sentencing are unlikely to be excessive.'
IV. DESIGNING SENTENCING JURIES
To the extent that jury autonomy occasionally clashes with the
modem values of efficiency, consistency, and expertise, this Part
outlines a viable jury sentencing regime that seeks to incorporate
these values. Because jury sentencing is not constitutionally re-
quired, legislatures are free to experiment with the amount and
type of constraints on jury authority. Indeed, the flexibility of jury
277 Jackson, supra note 17, at 15.
' Id. ("It is an unnecessary and time-consuming process to attempt to present to a
jury a defendant's past conduct and character, which can much more comprehensively
and efficiently be presented to a judge in a pre-sentence investigation report.").
2' In addition to dispensing with individualized pre-sentencing reports, states might
also cut costs by shifting to a supermajority rather than a unanimity decisionmaking
rule for sentencing decisions. See infra Section IV.F.2.
'o Data from Virginia and Texas, showing that jury sentencing represents less than
three percent of the state criminal caseload, suggests that the costs are quite manage-
able. See Va. Criminal Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 256, at 36; Tex. Office of
Court Admin., Texas Statewide Summary of Reported Activity (2001) (on file with
the Virginia Lav Review Association).
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sentencing is one of its virtues. It allows each jurisdiction to design
a sentencing regime that makes optimal use of the jury's democ-
ratic values, while minimizing their potential conflict with other
core principles of the criminal justice system.
A. Admissible Evidence and Jury Information
The wider range of punishments imposed by jurors has been
linked to the scarcity of information that has historically been pro-
vided to the jury at the sentencing stage." Until recently, juries in
most states were denied access to the defendant's criminal record'
and had no information about parole availability or about the
"usual sentence imposed and served in similar cases."'
Much relevant information about the defendant's background
and prospects for rehabilitation is still not being provided to sen-
tencing juries. Several states limit the evidence that is presented to
the jury at sentencing to that admissible at trial.' Texas is most
"' See Betts, supra note 17, at 371; Jackson, supra note 17, at 15-16; LaFont, supra
note 17, at 838; Linden, supra note 17, at 978-79; Reese, supra note 17, at 335-36.
See LaFont, supra note 17, at 838; Wright, supra note 17, at 1376-77. Missouri is
the only state that has maintained an unusually restrictive approach to the evidence
that can be admitted during sentencing. The restrictions are a result of the reluctance
to bifurcate the criminal trial into separate guilt and sentencing stages. In order not to
prejudice jurors against the defendant at the trial stage, Missouri bans the considera-
tion of prior criminal records or records of substance abuse. See State v. Jacobs, 939
S.W.2d 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hampton, 607 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980). To ensure that habitual offenders are sentenced more severely, therefore, it has
had to shift to judge sentencing for prior and persistent offenders so that the jury to-
day assesses punishment in fewer than ten percent of all noncapital cases. Jackson,
supra note 17, at 14-15.
Wright, supra note 17, at 1376-77.
2 In Oklahoma and Missouri, there is no special sentencing hearing (except for ha-
bitual offenders), so trial evidence rules apply. See supra note 223. In Virginia, evi-
dence admissible at trial and relating to punishment can be presented. Such evidence
includes
factors [that] generally relate to the nature of the offense, the characteristics of
the offender, programs available to the defendant, the likelihood of recidivism,
restitution, and sentences in similar cases.
... [Evidence also includes] such factors as the range of punishment estab-
lished by the legislature, the injury to the victim, the use of a weapon, the extent
of the offender's participation in the offense, the offender's motive in commit-
ting the offense, prior record and rehabilitative efforts, drug and alcohol use,
and age, health, and education.
Thomas D. Home, Some Thoughts on Bifurcated Sentencing in Non-Capital Felony
Cases in Virginia, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 465,475 (1996).
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liberal in its approach towards the admissibility of evidence,' but
the jury still lacks access to comprehensive expert evaluations of
the offender (which are commonly included in pre-sentencing re-
ports presented to sentencing judges).' Information about parole
is also generally not a proper subject for consideration by the
jury.' In Virginia, such information can only be introduced in
cases where parole is abolished.' Texas allows jurors to consider
parole laws generally, but not evidence of the way parole laws
might apply to the defendant before them." In brief, no state pro-
vides juries with anywhere near the amount of sentence-related in-
formation that is currently provided to judges."°
Knowledge about the defendant's background and about sen-
tencing practices and alternatives is essential to the legitimacy and
fairness of the process.29' At the same time, different methods of in-
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
Id. Virginia is the only state that makes such reports available to the jury upon
request by the defendant. See Duncan v. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d 392,394 (Va. Ct.
App. 1986).
See Haynes v. State, 846 S.W.2d 179,181 (Ark. 1993); Goodson v. State, 562 P.2d
521, 526 (Okla. 1977). But see Boone v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Ky.
1989) (holding that both the prosecution and the defense can introduce evidence of
minimum parole eligibility).
"' Home, supra note 284, at 475. With the abolition of parole and the requirement
that sentenced prisoners serve a minimum specified period of the sentence imposed,
the court may be asked to inform the jury that a defendant will be required to serve a
minimum portion of his sentence prior to release. Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532
S.E.2d 629 (Va. 2000). This is to be distinguished from the mandate that the jury may
not consider parole or the sentencing guidelines. Home, supra note 284, at 477 (citing
Eaton v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385 (Va. 1990)).
'Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a)-(d) (Vernon Supp. 2003).
"' Kentucky's legislature, which passed a Truth-in-Sentencing Act to educate jurors
as fully as possible about sentencing options, has not provided for the preparation of
pre-sentencing reports for the benefit of jury deliberations. The statute allows jurors
to consider the prior record of a defendant, minimum parole eligibility, and any evi-
dence offered by the defendant in mitigation. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.055(2)(a)
(Michie 1999). Similarly, the Texas statute, otherwise very liberal with respect to the
information provided to the jury about the defendant's background, calls for a pre-
sentencing investigative report only where the sentencing is done by a judge. Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 2003); see also Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-299 (Michie Supp. 2002) (explaining that, in certain cases, a court may order
the preparation of a pre-sentencing investigative report to aid the judge during sen-
tencing).
2"1 Interviews with jurors in Texas at the time when the jury received little informa-
tion about the defendant at the sentencing hearings reveal disappointment with the
process upon learning about the type of information withheld from the jury. Joe
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forming the jury have different costs and benefits. Pre-sentencing
reports are time-consuming and expensive and are largely duplica-
tive of the information that could be provided at a sentencing hear-
ing with liberal evidentiary rules. By contrast, the procedure fol-
lowed in Texas-allowing plentiful evidence about the defendant
at the jury sentencing hearing and preparing pre-sentencing reports
only when judges sentence-may strike the right balance between
efficiency and disclosure.
At present, jurors also lack information that would allow them
to gain a more holistic understanding of the sentencing system. Pa-
role and sentencing statistics and sentencing guidelines are gener-
ally kept away from jurors.' For example, in Missouri,
"[i]nforming juries of sentences of defendants in similar cases or
the sentences of co-participants in the crime on trial is strictly pro-
hibited under the rules of evidence."'2 Similarly, the Kentucky
Truth-in-Sentencing statute, which generally increases the informa-
tion available to sentencing juries, does not provide for sentencing
guidelines and statistics.'M Kentucky courts have also held parole
eligibility statistics inadmissible.29
Interestingly, the only jurisdiction that at one time provided ju-
rors with sentencing statistics and guidelines was the military. This
practice ended in the late 1950s, however, as the military's judicial
philosophy shifted its emphasis away from sentencing uniformity
and towards individualized judgments. The United States Court of
Military Appeals held that jurors were not to consider sentences in
similar cases or to consult the sentencing manual (which contained
Goulden, Jurors Urge Disclosure of Past Record, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 28,
1960, § 3.
22 Texas and Virginia, for example, which are otherwise liberal in the information
they admit at sentencing, fail to provide jurors with sentencing guidelines and statis-
tics. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-298.01 (Michie 2000). In Texas, factors "in mitigation of
punishment" may be introduced, but those have been limited only to factors that have
a relationship to the circumstances of the offense or to the defendant before or at the
time of the offense. See Brown v. State, 674 S.W.2d 443,447 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
293 Jackson, supra note 17, at 17. It is ironic that Missouri has a Sentencing Advisory
Commission which has promulgated guidelines that judges-but not juries-are privy
to and encouraged to follow.
29 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.055 (Michie 1999).
295 See Abbott v. Commonwealth, 822 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky. 1992).
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flexible sentencing guidelines to benefit jurors during their delib-
eration). 6
Furnishing jurors with data on the prevailing sentencing and pa-
role practices would allow them to "combine insights about indi-
vidual cases with some understanding of the system as a whole."'
As discussed in Section III.B, if jurors have a broader view of the
sentencing system, they are less likely to render arbitrarily dispa-
rate sentences. In Scotland, for example, sentencing statistics are
provided to judges with precisely that goal in mind.298 In the early
1970s, the U.S. Parole Commission also devised a matrix based on
average past sentencing and parole practices, which was voluntarily
followed by some federal judges.' At the same time, the U.S.
Board of Parole commissioned reports on the creation of a data-
base and an information retrieval system to guide future parole de-
cisionmaking.'
At least one commentator has suggested that similar databases
and statistics could be generated for sentencing jurors. As Ronald
Wright notes, "[a] standard report could inform jurors of the aver-
age sentence imposed for persons convicted of the same crimes as
the defendant, and for persons who have a similar criminal record.
The report could even describe the distribution of sentences for
that category of offense and offender."' Statistics could be com-
piled at the county, district, or state level. On the one hand,
county-by-county statistics would be more expensive to generate,
but they would give jurors a better sense of sentence preferences in
the local community. Data at the state level, on the other hand, in
addition to costing less, might give jurors more flexibility in arriv-
ing at their sentence (jurors may be more willing to depart from
2" James Kevin Lovejoy, Abolition of Court Member Sentencing in the Military,
142 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1993) (citing United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 180
(C.M.A. 1959), and United States v. Rinehart, 24 C.M.R. 212,215-16 (C.M.A. 1957)).
2 Wright, supra note 17, at 1373.
2' Id. at 1386.
"' Don M. Gottfredson et al., Guidelines for Parole and Sentencing: A Policy Con-
trol Method 25-33 (1978).
' See Susan M. Singer & Don M. Gottfredson, Parole Decision-Making: Develop-
ment of a Data Base for Parole Decision-Making 1 (1972); Max S. Zeigler et al., Nat'l
Council on Crime & Delinquency, 10 Parole Decision-Making: Use of an Information
Retrieval System for Parole Decision-Making 2-3 (1972).
,0 Wright, supra note 17, at 1377.
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data aggregated at the state level in order to account for local sen-
tencing preferences). Finally, reports covering regional sentencing
statistics have already been generated for the purpose of devising
sentencing guidelines and are being provided to judges in some
states, so it would hardly be more burdensome to make them
available to juries.
There are, of course, practical limits on the amount of informa-
tion that could be presented to the jury. Statistics are expensive to
generate, and in addition, too much information might result in
cognitive overload and confusion for the jury. Furthermore, jurors
might all too easily gravitate toward the average sentence and thus
end their deliberation about the individual case prematurely. Be-
cause of their powerful anchoring effect on juror decisionmaking,
statistics might also hinder progressive developments in sentencing.
Cognizant of these possibilities, lawyers for each side could distin-
guish each particular defendant's case from the average case illus-
trated by the sentencing statistics or even challenge the norms un-
derlying those averages altogether. In the end, the benefits of this
proposal outweigh the potential costs: Providing jurors with infor-
mation about parole and sentencing practices would not only serve
the goal of consistency and the fair administration of justice, but
would also promote the transparency and accountability of the jus-
tice system.
B. Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines for Jurors
Even if some of the information tools described in the previous
Section are too expensive to generate, legislatures could at least
make available to jurors information that is regularly provided to
judges-some form of sentencing guidelines. Mandatory for judges,
sentencing guidelines could be voluntary for jurors-that is to say,
true "guidelines."
By 1999, fifteen states had enacted legislation enabling the crea-
tion of sentencing guidelines, and seven had significantly pro-
gressed in developing guidelines systems. 2 Importantly, state sen-
tencing guidelines differ significantly from those promulgated by
the Commission. First, several states-especially in more recent
Sentencing Guidelines Systems, supra note 93.
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years-have adopted voluntary guidelines. 3 Second, even where
the guidelines are mandatory, they are often easier to apply. Some
state guidelines prescribe only presumptive sanctions for the "usual
case" and allow for a range of departures in atypical cases."° By
contrast, the federal guidelines are much stricter and allow depar-
tures only in exceptional circumstances. They rely on a "base case"
approach that assigns a point value to the minimal elements of the
offense that must be shown for a conviction, and then proceeds
through complex mechanical formulas to add points for aggravat-
ing factors or, occasionally, to subtract points for mitigating fac-
tors.305
Because of their greater flexibility and easy application, state
sentencing regimes strike a fairer balance between the values of
individualized judgment and uniform sentencing practices than the
federal sentencing system. These virtues of state sentencing re-
gimes can and should be incorporated into jury sentencing regimes
to promote consistency in jury verdicts. Among the jury sentencing
states, Virginia, Arkansas, and Missouri have already created sen-
tencing commissions and charged them with promulgating volun-
tary sentencing guidelines, although these guidelines have thus far
been provided only to judges." State legislatures could commission
studies to find which guideline systems are most effective in achiev-
ing each jurisdiction's stated sentencing goals and most compre-
hensible to laypersons.
The guidelines could be included in the written instructions that
jurors receive from the judge prior to their deliberation. If jurors
receive the guidelines in this fashion, however, they may too easily
suspend deliberation on other issues and simply try to comply with
the guidelines. The possibility is even higher if the jurors know that
their sentencing determination might be overturned upon review
by the judge. To prevent this deliberation-halting effect, legisla-
tures could instead allow jurors to receive guidelines only upon re-
quest." If the parties refer to the guidelines during their sentencing
""13 Id.
2'A See Knapp & Hauptly, supra note 95, at 681-82, 684-85.
z
5 Id. at 685-86.
""See Sentencing Guidelines Systems, supra note 93; Va. Code Ann. § 17.1-803
(Michie 1999); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-298.01 (Michie Supp. 2002).
-" I thank Tracey Meares for this suggestion.
2003]
Virginia Law Review
arguments, jurors will likely want to avail themselves of that oppor-
tunity.
In the end, however, guidelines are a second-best option to sen-
tencing statistics. They articulate a greater range of relevant sen-
tencing factors than can be presented by statistics. Yet precisely for
that reason, guidelines may be more difficult to design, compre-
hend, and apply. Especially given jurors' lack of experience with
sentencing, the guidelines are less likely to promote the desired
consistency and proportionality among cases.' The main advan-
tage of guideline systems is that many states have already devel-
oped them for purposes of judicial sentencing, so they could be
presented to the jury at little additional cost.
C. Statutory Sentencing Limits
In all states that currently employ jury sentencing, the jury is lim-
ited in its discretion by the statutory ranges set by the legislature.'
The extent to which legislatures limit the jury's discretion depends
on the relative value that each jurisdiction places on sentencing
uniformity versus individualized judgment. The dissatisfaction with
indeterminate sentencing regimes suggests that the absence of any
statutory limits on the jury's sentencing discretion may not be vi-
able because it conflicts too gravely with the value of sentence con-
sistency.
Jury participation is most legitimate and fair when it operates
within limits set in advance by the legislature. Supreme Court ju-
risprudence on jury sentencing in capital cases is instructive on that
point: "[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a mat-
ter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should
be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action.""31 Under the Court's guidance, state legislatures have
'3 Cf. William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview
of Early Findings, 70 Ind. L.J. 1043, 1091-93 (1995) (finding that capital jurors often
fail to comprehend sentencing guidelines).
'"Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-107(b)(1), (c), (d) (Michie 1987); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 532.055(2) (Michie 1999); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 928.1 (West Supp. 2003); Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-295 (Michie 2002); Mo. R. Crim. P. §§ 29.04, 29.06 (Vernon 2002).
"' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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passed statutes that channel the jury's discretion in death penalty
cases and promote sentence uniformity.'
On the other hand, mandatory minimums and narrow statutory
sentencing ranges have been blamed for producing unwarranted
severity and unfairness in particular cases."2 In light of the mount-
ing criticism, legislatures may reconsider the need for mandatory
minimums.313 If both minimums and maximums are maintained,
however, statutory ranges should be sufficiently broad to allow the
jury to make fair, case-by-case sentencing decisions. Such a solu-
tion would strike a good balance between the goals of individuali-
zation and consistency in the sentencing process.
D. Judicial Participation in Jury Sentencing
The relationship between the jury and the judge can be struc-
tured in different ways, depending on the relative value that each
community attaches to jury autonomy versus efficiency, expertise,
and defendants' rights. One important way in which judge and jury
interact at the sentencing stage is through instructions. The instruc-
tions could encourage the jury to deliberate longer, to deliberate in
a particular manner, and to consider specific sentencing factors.314
Judges could also intervene more directly in the process. They
could be given powers to set the sentence in case of jury deadlock,
keep jury verdicts within the legal limits, and even adjust sentences
to prevent unwarranted disparities. All jury sentencing states ex-
cept Texas allow the judge to fix the punishment in case the jury
fails to agree on a sentence, a decision that reflects an emphasis on
'
11 To that end, the statutes provide for a bifurcated trial, for detailed jury instruc-
tions on aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered in the decision on the
death penalty, and for appeal of the sentence to the state supreme court. See Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302
(1976) (striking down North Carolina's sentencing statute as failing to adequately
constrain jury discretion in capital sentencing cases).
Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 2421 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(pointing to numerous critiques of the mandatory minimum sentencing statutes);
Lowenthal, supra note 96, at 63.
31' Some have already done so. See Moran, supra note 2.
14 Studies of citizens' juries show that moderators can exercise great influence over
the deliberation process through the instructions and explanations that they provide
to the participants. Smith & Wales, supra note 164, at 59. Similarly, studies of jury in-
structions show that jurors spend substantial time and effort attempting to apply judi-
cial instructions. Diamond & Levi, supra note 198, at 225.
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efficiency over unbounded jury autonomy. 5 Arkansas allows the
judge to modify the jury's sentence, but only in favor of the defen-
dant. The threshold for judicial intervention is rather low-the
judge may reduce the sentence imposed by the jury whenever she
finds that the punishment "is greater than, under the circumstances
of the case, ought to be inflicted."3 '6 Oklahoma law provides for
appellate review of jury sentences.' Virginia has gone even further
and has established a two-stage sentencing proceeding, where the
jury makes a sentencing recommendation, but the judge pro-
nounces the final sentence."' Although the recommendation is
merely advisory, it is usually accorded great deference."'
Mixed tribunals of professional and lay judges, used in Germany,
provide yet another model of judge-jury interaction.32 Professional
and lay judges deliberate together at both the trial and sentencing
stages. While the decision is arrived at jointly, the professional
judges are in charge of preparing a written opinion stating the
court's findings and reasoning. 2 Advocates of the mixed court cite
two advantages that it has over the jury-only system. First, a mixed
court is allegedly more efficient because participation by the judges
dispenses with the need for procedural tools for jury control, such
3,' Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-107(a) (Michie 1987); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.055(4)
(Michie 1999); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 557.036(2) (West 1999); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,
§ 927.1 (West Supp. 2003). In Texas, a deadlocked sentencing jury results in a mistrial,
and another sentencing hearing is held. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(c)
(Vernon 1981).316 Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-107(e) (Michie 1987). Missouri also allows the judge to
reduce the jury sentence, albeit under more limited circumstances. State v.
McClanahan, 954 S.W.2d 476,481-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
1,7 James v. State, 818 P.2d 918, 922 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1111 (1992).
318 Horne, supra note 284, at 466 (noting that, in Virginia, "[the] 'ultimate sen-
tence.., does not [therefore] rest with the jury' alone but is always subject to the con-
trol of the trial judge. This procedure makes the jury's finding little more than an ad-
visory or first-step decision.") (citation omitted).
319 Id. at 468; Va. Criminal Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 256, at 38 (finding that
judges modified jury sentences in less than one-fourth of the cases in 2002 and that
modifications were often slighter than would be warranted under the voluntary sen-
tencing guidelines).
30 Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Al-
ternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 991-92 (1983); John
H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the
American Need?, 1981 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 195, 197-205.321 Langbein, supra note 320, at 199-200.
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as the exclusion of potentially prejudicial evidence and the crafting
of jury instructions.'m Second, "the presence of professional judges
in deliberations, the requirement of reasoned opinion, and liberal
appellate review" guard against juror inexperience and inconsistent
sentencing.'m
Legislatures concerned with unbridled jury authority could fol-
low Virginia's example and create a system of judicial review akin
to the deferential review accorded to federal agencies,32 or they
could set up mixed tribunals similar to those used in Germany.
Both of these systems address concerns about arbitrary sentences
resulting from a particular jury's prejudices or lack of comprehen-
sion of the evidence or the instructions."2 As the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remarked with respect to
jury sentencing procedures in Virginia:
Any criticism of jury sentencing because it lacks the objectivity
and principled decision of a judge is thus overcome by the exis-
tence of the power in the trial judge to bring his so-called supe-
rior judgment to bear upon the issue of proper punishment in
reaching his decision whether to suspend the sentence or not.3 26
Although both the German and the Virginia models promote
consistent sentencing, both can be assailed on deliberative democ-
racy grounds. The German mixed court model places too great a
restraint on juror deliberation because jurors are likely to defer to
the judge too often and too quickly. A study of German mixed
courts found that, during sentencing, laypersons influence only
thirty-two percent of the cases in which there is initial disagree-
ment.27 Even under the Virginia model, some jurors might follow
' Id. at 202. It is doubtful, however, that the full-time participation of judges in the
jury deliberation is more efficient than a jury-only deliberation, even where the costs
of instructing the jury and presenting evidence are subtracted.
Id.
n4 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,865 (1984).
'See Home, supra note 284, at 466 (noting that the provision for review in Virginia
guards against arbitrariness in jury sentencing).
Vines v. Muncy, 553 F.2d 342,349 (4th Cir. 1977).
.17 Gerhard Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J.
Legal Stud. 135, 189 (1972). Judges and juries initially disagreed with respect to about
twenty percent of the sentencing decisions. Notably, lay influence on sentencing was
greater than on guilt determinations, in part because sentencing disagreements were
often resolved by compromise. Id. at 153-54, 189.
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sentencing statistics or guidelines mechanically in order to avoid
reversal." In the end, however, the Virginia model of judicial re-
view is clearly better than mixed courts at capturing the value of
the jury's democratic and deliberative decisionmaking. Therefore,
to prevent the occasional wayward sentences and yet preserve the
legitimacy and deliberative functions of their jury sentencing re-
gimes, states should follow Virginia's model and establish a prac-
tice of deferential judicial review.329
E. Juries and the Defendant
The proper balance between jury autonomy and defendants'
rights is another important question implicated in structuring a jury
sentencing regime. As the previous Section noted, Arkansas has
tipped the scale in favor of defendants' rights by allowing the judge
to reduce the sentence imposed by the jury. Another way to ac-
commodate individual rights is to grant the defendant an uncondi-
tional right to waive jury sentencing.' Allowing unconditional
waivers interferes with the ability of the community to participate
in sentencing decisionmaking and allows for "forum-shopping" by
criminal defendants. For that reason, defendants in the federal sys-
tem and in many states are not allowed to waive their right to a
jury trial without the consent of the prosecution." ' Similarly, Ken-
3 Interviews with civil jurors whose punitive damage awards have been reversed
show the great disappointment of those jurors with the reversals. William Glaberson,
Juries, Their Powers Under Siege, Find Their Role Is Being Eroded, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 2, 2001, at Al. In that sense, frequent reversals might also erode public confi-
dence in the system.
.. Experience in the punitive damages context also confirms the ability of courts to
review jury verdicts even in the absence of a written opinion justifying those verdicts.
"'Two states authorize such waivers. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 557.036(2)(1) (West
1999); Lanni, supra note 17, at 1793 (commenting on defendants' ability to waive jury
sentencing in Virginia). In Texas, the defendant must request jury sentencing prior to
trial; accordingly, the failure of such a request is tantamount to a waiver of the right.
Caro v. State, 771 S.W.2d 610, 619 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
3 Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a) (stating that the prosecutor must consent to the defen-
dant's waiver of jury trial); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 26 (1965) (holding
that the Rule does not violate due process); id. at 36 (listing states that make waiver
contingent on approval by the prosecutor or the court).
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tucky allows waivers of jury sentencing only with the assent of the
prosecution,3n and Oklahoma requires judicial approval as well.333
Unconditional waivers and the Arkansas model of judicial re-
view could be defended as protections against jury unfairness.
They are only an imperfect guard against arbitrariness, however; a
better way to ensure fairness is to institute the structural changes
proposed in earlier Sections. Therefore, a robust regime of jury
sentencing would only allow waivers upon the assent of the prose-
cution and permit both upward and downward judicial modifica-
tions of jury verdicts.3
F. Enhancing the Process of Jury Deliberation
The legitimacy of the sentencing juries' decisions depends not
only on the outcomes of the jury's deliberations, but also on the
process by which the outcomes are attained. The selection of ju-
rors, the conditions of deliberation, and the decisionmaking rules
are therefore of crucial importance to the success of a jury sentenc-
ing regime.
1. Inclusivity
To fulfill the role of a deliberative democratic body, the jury
needs to be inclusive of diverse viewpoints in the community at
large. While Supreme Court jurisprudence in the past half century
has banned the exclusion of jurors based on race, gender, and eth-
nicity, and has endorsed the ideal of a jury as a representative of a
"cross-section of the community,""33 affirmative measures are still
needed to promote genuine inclusivity of diverse views. 36 To that
-"' Commonwealth v. Collins, 933 S.W.2d 811, 819 (Ky. 1996) (noting that the defen-
dant could not waive jury sentencing without Commonwealth's consent).
... Case v. State, 555 P.2d 619, 625 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (holding that both
prosecutor and judge must assent to defendant's waiver of jury sentencing). Arkansas
also lacks a provision for waiver of jury sentencing by the defendant.
"' In practice, such waivers would be used most often in cases of plea bargaining.
.. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that race-based peremptory
challenges violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975) (holding that the jury must represent a "fair cross-section" of the commu-
nit ).Recent studies reveal that certain groups, including minorities and the poor, are
still underrepresented on juries. See Hiroshi Fukurai, Race, Social Class, and Jury
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end, some commentators have suggested increasing the pay for ju-
rors, limiting the grounds on which jurors may be excused from
service, and punishing shirking with heavy fines.337 Others have
proposed increasing the size of juries to ensure representative-
ness.33 Finally, some have argued for the abolition of peremptory
strikes (and the reconsideration of strikes for cause) to increase the
representativeness of the jury.39 Abramson, in particular, has la-
mented the exclusion from the jury of persons showing any interest
or engagement in public affairs."4 Abolishing peremptory strikes
and enacting measures to increase compliance with jury duty are
easy and economically viable steps toward a more inclusive jury.
Because a diverse jury is central to deliberative democracy and a
fair sentencing process, states should take all necessary means to
ensure such diversity.
2. Fostering Sustained Deliberation
Even if these measures achieve a formal representation of di-
verse views on the jury, power imbalances might prevent some
members from participating fully in the jury's deliberations and
contributing their unique perspectives to the decisionmaking proc-
ess. Therefore, genuine inclusivity cannot be achieved without
some regulation of the deliberation process itself, just as thoughtful
deliberation cannot come about without some regulation of the
jury's composition.
Participation: New Dimensions for Evaluating Discrimination in Jury Service and
Jur33 Selection, 24 J. Crim. Just. 71, 84-85 (1996).
3 Amar, supra note 58, at 168-70. For an extensive review of the relative success of
different measures against jury dodging, see generally King, supra note 203. See also
Mark Curriden, No Excuses: New York Cracks Down on Those Avoiding Jury Duty,
Dallas Morning News, Oct. 24, 2000, at Al (reporting on the success of the measures
implemented by New York City to increase compliance with jury duty).
" Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment in
Jury Reform, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 133, 136 (1996) (proposing that cases be heard
and deliberated by twenty-four jurors, of whom only twelve, selected at random,
would vote on the verdict).
339 Abramson, supra note 46, at 53-55; Amar, supra note 58, at 170-71; cf. Lichtman.
supra note 338, at 149 ("[Consensus-creating tools ('for cause' challenges and per-
emptory strikes) exclude jurors with extreme viewpoints. This exclusion tends to
make juries more homogeneous and, hence, more likely to agree at the outset. This
means that juries are less likely to debate than our statistics predict.").
' oAbramson, supra note 46, at 53-55.
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A relatively straightforward way to promote thoughtful and re-
spectful deliberation is to preserve the requirement for a unani-
mous jury decision. Unanimity is not among the jury's most cele-
brated features. Even ardent defenders of the jury have opposed
unanimity: It is thought to be undemocratic because it gives undue
power to recalcitrant holdouts"' and redundant once representa-
tiveness is ensured through other means.2' The Supreme Court has
similarly held that unanimity is not essential to the enforcement of
the Sixth Amendment.3'
However intuitively plausible, the argument for the abolition of
unanimity has been challenged by studies on the deliberation ef-
fects of unanimity requirements. Researchers have observed that,
when less than unanimity is required to reach a decision, delibera-
tion ceases a few minutes after the votes needed for the verdict
have been counted.' Mock studies have also shown that majority-
verdict juries overall spend less time deliberating and correcting er-
rors of fact. 5 The same studies have found that, in juries bound by
a majority rule only, the majority deliberates in a more bullying
and combative manner, cognizant of the holdouts' irrelevance to
the verdict. 6
" Akhil R. Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1169, 1191 (1995).2 Amar, supra note 58, at 176 ("[I]f everyone now gets to serve on a jury and we
eliminate all the old undemocratic barriers, preserving unanimity might also be un-
democratic, for it would create an extreme minority veto unknown to the Foun-
ders.").
""Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972). The Court rejected the defendants' argument that unanimity was indispensa-
ble to the participation in the jury deliberations of members of previously excluded
groups. Abramson, supra note 46, at 187 ("While members of racial, religious, or eth-
nic minorities, women, poor people, young people or other previously excluded
groups may now be represented on juries, a rule permitting a less than unanimous
verdict makes it possible for a verdict to be rendered without their acquiescence and
indeed -without the consideration of their views.") (citing Defendant's Brief in Apo-
daca).
' Abramson, supra note 46, at 199; Hastie et al., supra note 198, at 95.
m See Abramson, supra note 46, at 200; Hastie et al., supra note 198, at 76, 163
(finding that non-unanimous juries tended to deliberate less); Davis et al., supra note
261, at 8-9 (same).
Abramson, supra note 46, at 200.
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In addition to improving the quality of deliberation, unanimity
might enhance the legitimacy of the verdict. 7 Unanimous juries
are perceived as more accurate, more thorough, more likely to lis-
ten to holdouts, and generally fairer.' Jurors who serve under a
unanimity rule are also more satisfied with and confident in the
jury's verdict, perhaps because juries operating under unanimity
are more likely to produce consensus at the end of the delibera-
tion. 9
At the same time, unanimity is more likely to result in hung ju-
ries."' Hung juries both raise the costs of jury sentencing and likely
leave jurors less satisfied with the jury's work. A unanimity re-
quirement at the sentencing stage is also more likely to lead ex-
hausted jurors to resort to "quotient verdicts," whereby they sim-
ply tally up each juror's preferred sentence and record the average
as the final verdict.5'
The costs of unanimity may well prompt some legislatures to opt
for a super-majority voting rule, supplemented by other delibera-
tion-forcing mechanisms. Such methods might include judicial in-
structions on the duty to deliberate conscientiously, emphasizing
the virtues of deliberation and perhaps mentioning explicitly the
prohibition against quotient verdicts.352 In addition, jurors might be
'
7 Id. at 203 ("Common sense alone tells us that public confidence in the accuracy of
verdicts is greater when the verdict is unanimous.").
' Hastie et al., supra note 198, at 76; MacCoun & Tyler, supra note 200, at 337-38,
338 tbl.1.
9 Hastie et al., supra note 198, at 76, 79.
3 o Id. at 60.
"' Linden, supra note 17, at 985 (citing observations by a Commonwealth's Attor-
ney and a Virginia judge about the danger of "quotient verdicts"). In most states, if
defendants raise the issue of a "quotient verdict," they are entitled to an evidentiary
hearing at which they can cross-examine jurors about the sentencing deliberations.
See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 761 P.2d 887, 889 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). Usually, defen-
dants exercise this right if they find some evidence, for example, scraps of paper, indi-
cating the possibility that the jurors did not deliberate, but merely tallied up their in-
dividual sentence preference to deliver a quotient verdict. See Storie v. State, 390 So.
2d 1179, 1182-84 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (holding that a new trial on the grounds of a
"quotient verdict" should not be granted although counsel found scraps of paper with
sentence calculations in the trash basket of the jury room); Wheat v. State, 202 So. 2d
65, 69-72 (Ala. Ct. App. 1967) (similar); Matter of J.F., Jr., 948 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997) (similar). But see State v. Simmons, 563 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (holding that jurors will not be heard to impeach their own verdict).
312 In Texas, for example, a new trial shall be granted to an accused where "the ver-
dict has been decided by lot or in any manner other than a fair expression of the ju-
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required to certify that they deliberated carefully,353 in compliance
with the judge's instructions.
Yet it is also true that unanimity at the sentencing level is less
expensive than at the trial level. While trial juries have a binary
choice between a verdict of guilty or not guilty, sentencing juries
can negotiate a sentence that takes into consideration a wider
gamut of opinions. Furthermore, whereas hung trials postpone
judgment at significant cost to society, hung sentencing juries need
not lead to mistrials. In fact, most states that currently employ jury
sentencing authorize the judge to fix the punishment where the
sentencing jury fails to reach a decision after prolonged delibera-
tion."
Given the deliberation-forcing quality of unanimity, it may be
wise to retain it at the sentencing stage. Unanimity need not obvi-
ate other mechanisms that foster discussion, however. Judicial in-
structions to deliberate conscientiously remain important in ensur-
ing thoughtful jury decisionmaking and preventing quotient
verdicts.
CONCLUSION
In an era where scientific rationality, consistency, and expertise
reign supreme among the values of the legal world, it is no surprise
that lay participation in adjudication and sentencing has attracted
wide criticism. Critics of the jury, however, have ignored the re-
deeming values of the institution and have failed to examine
whether there are particular contexts in which these values out-
weigh the costs of jury decisionmaking. As this Article argues, sen-
tencing is a context in which the need for sensitive moral and po-
litical determinations and for case-by-case decisionmaking makes
jury participation particularly appropriate.
rors' opinion." Tex. R. App. P. 21.3(c) (Vernon Supp. 2002); Matter of J.F., Jr., 948
S.W.2d at 810.
' E-mail from Neal Katyal, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center,
to Jenia Iontcheva, Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law
School (Oct. 2,2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
'- To avoid a complete shift of discretion to the judge in those situations, legisla-
tures could require judges to poll the jury and take into account the jurors' prefer-
ences in making the final sentencing decision.
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Because of its ability to render individualized judgments and to
reconcile conflicting views through deliberation rather than aggre-
gation, the jury is better situated than legislatures to make concrete
sentencing decisions. Importantly, the jury can make such case-
specific sentencing decisions "while holding a stronger democratic
pedigree than a sentencing judge." '355 This ability of the jury to le-
gitimate the sentencing process seems especially important in light
of studies showing that perceptions of the fairness of sentencing in-
fluence compliance with the law and cooperation with law en-
forcement.356
As discussed earlier, the history of the early American republic
provides ample historical precedent for a movement back in the di-
rection of jury sentencing. The recent decisions of the Supreme
Court in Apprendi, Gaudin, and Ring, represent the first signs of a
new recognition of the jury's contributions. With these decisions,
the Court has taken a half-step in the direction of jury sentencing,
which may create a host of thin distinctions that will remain until
the entire step is completed.
Legislatures should take the initiative and create jury sentencing
regimes that build on the jury's democratic contributions, while
minimizing the jury's disadvantages. A review of the existing jury
sentencing regimes shows that many states have chosen to place
checks on the jury's authority where unbridled discretion would
imperil other important sentencing values. Areas remain, however,
in which the current sentencing regimes need to be reformed in or-
der to capitalize on the jury's democratic potential. Legislatures
need to give jurors the information and instructions necessary to
promote thoughtful and respectful deliberation. Providing jurors
with sentencing statistics or guidelines and instituting judicial re-
view is also essential to ensuring the consistency of the jury's sen-
... Wright, supra note 17, at 1378.3
6Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 57-68, 161-69 (1990) (finding a direct
correlation between the perceived fairness in sentencing and compliance with the
law); see also George Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Gang Behavior, Law Enforcement,
and Community Values, in Values and Public Policy 173, 185 (Henry J. Aaron et al.
eds., 1994) ("Community members are assumed to be less willing to cooperate the
higher the gap, positive or negative, between the penalties leveled against offenders
and those considered fair by the community. Thus, if penalties are either too low or
too high, observers of crimes are less likely to reveal information to the police.").
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tencing decisions and promoting the ideal of equality before the
law.
These proposed reforms reflect a vision of the jury working side-
by-side with other institutions of the criminal justice system to
serve the sometimes conflicting ideals of democracy and justice. If
recovered as a central institution in our system of checks and bal-
ances, juries can bring to sentencing a unique mix of qualities that
would enhance both the legitimacy of that process and the health
of our democracy.
